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Single species management of multispecies fisheries ignores biological 
interactions in addition to important technological interactions resulting from the 
multiproduct nature of firms' production often to the detriment of the health of the 
ecosystem, the stocks of fish species, and fishery profits.  This dissertation solves a 
dynamic optimization problem of maximizing the net present value from a three species 
fishery and uses numerical optimization techniques to determine the optimal harvest 
quota of each species given the biological and technological interactions.  The model is 
then extended to the case of a nuisance species, a species that lowers the value of the 
fishery by negatively affecting the growth of other species in the ecosystem, and has little 
harvest value of its own.  As approaches for ecosystem-based fisheries management are 
 
developed, results demonstrate the importance of focusing not only on the economically 
valuable species interact, but also on some non-harvested species, as they can affect the 
productivity and availability of higher value species.   
 This study uses the arrowtooth flounder, Pacific cod, and walleye pollock 
fisheries in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands region of Alaska as a case study and finds the 
net present value of the fishery is decreased from $20.7 billion to $8.5 billion dollars by 
ignoring arrowtooth’s role as a nuisance species on the growth of Pacific cod and walleye 
pollock.   The optimal subsidy on the harvest of arrowtooth summed over all years is $35 
million dollars, which increases the net present value by $273 million dollars, after 
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1.1 Introduction  
 The need for ecosystem based fisheries management is well recognized [1-3], but 
substantial obstacles remain toward implementing these approaches given current 
understanding of the biological complexities of the ecosystem along with the economic 
complexities surrounding resource use.  Currently, the predominant biological reference 
point for U.S. fisheries management is the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of each 
individual species in an ecosystem.  Single species management of multispecies fisheries 
ignores the ecological relationships among species as well as the technological 
relationships between species if multiple species are caught jointly or vessels allocate 
their effort among multiple target species.  Ignoring these biological and technological 
multispecies aspects of fishery management often results in the declining health of the 
ecosystem, the stocks of fish species, and fishery profits.   
 While the ecological interactions have long been recognized, multispecies stock 
assessment models are still relatively new [4].  Likewise, there are numerous studies of 
the multiproduct nature of firms’ production of multiple fish species using dual 
estimation models [5-9].1  These studies generally reject input/output separability, which 
implies that fishing technology should be measured in a disaggregated manner.  
Aggregating data will result in a misspecification of the fishing technology if the fishing 
technology rejects input/output separability [10].  With the exception of Singh and 
Weninger [11], previous studies attempting to account for technological interactions 
within bioeconomic models [12, 13] typically assume that only a single composite input 
                                                 
1 See Jensen 10. Jensen, C.L., Applications of Dual Theory in Fisheries: A Survey. Marine Resource 
Economics, 2002. 17: p. 309-344. for a survey of empirical applications of dual theory in fisheries.   
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(effort) is used to catch multiple species, which implicitly assumes that output is 
separable from the composite input as may not be the case in many fisheries. 
These technological interactions among species manifest themselves as bycatch, 
combined harvesting, multiproduct fishing vessels, economies or diseconomies of scope, 
and as adjustments to the allocation of effort across species.  These technological 
interactions can have significant impact on the successful management of the fishery.  
Vessels that exhibit joint production technology cannot produce one target species 
without also catching other species at the same time and without incurring additional 
costs.   If a vessel’s technology is joint in production, policies that fail to take this into 
account are likely to result in increased discarding or highgrading of exploited species.2   
As ecosystem based approaches are developed, the impact of non-harvested 
species should not be overlooked.  In economic models, non-harvested species have been 
included as bycatch and discards [11, 14, 15], or as harvest constraints via bycatch quotas 
[16].  However, non-harvested species can be predators or prey for the target species and 
thus impact the stock dynamics of target species.  As a result, this likely leads to changes 
in optimal harvesting strategies for the target species.  One example of a non-harvested 
species that can impact target species harvesting strategies is a nuisance species which 
lowers the value of the fishery by negatively affecting the growth of the other species in 
the ecosystem even though it has little harvest value of its own.  Chapter 4 explores how 
a nuisance species impacts the optimal multispecies harvesting in a three species 
ecosystem, and explores how a subsidy on the nuisance species can increase the net 
present value of the fishery.   
                                                 
2 Highgrading is defined as the practice of discarding legal sized but relatively smaller fish and landing 
relatively larger fish.  This behavior is often a result of a quantity restriction on harvest such as a quota.   
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This dissertation solves a dynamic optimization problem of maximizing the net 
present value (NPV) from a three species fishery while estimating the growth and vessel 
production parameters to determine the optimal harvest quota of three species in the 
fishery.  The theoretical model highlights the importance of both biological and 
technological interactions when determining optimal quota levels in a multispecies or 
ecosystem-based management approach.  The empirical results demonstrate that some 
gear types are found to exhibit jointness in production, as well as economies and 
diseconomies of scope.  The numerical optimization results demonstrate that the 
biological interactions have a substantial impact on the optimal outcome.  Diseconomies 
of scope result in a net cost increase of $233 million dollars for the entire fishery, and a 
substantial increase in the harvesting of arrowtooth flounder is optimal.   
The contribution of this study to the understanding of fisheries economics 
includes (i) the use of a bioeconomic model that incorporates biological and 
technological interdependence among species, (ii) examining how single species 
management differs from multispecies management in terms of net present value and 
stock abundance, (iii) estimating all of the parameters of the growth and profit equations 
to allow for comparison of the relative importance of these interactions in multispecies 
management, and (iv) exploring the role of optimal harvesting of a nuisance species 
(arrowtooth flounder) in the context of multispecies fisheries management.   
1.2 A Three Species Ecosystem 
 This study uses the walleye pollock, Pacific cod, and arrowtooth flounder 
(hereafter referred to as pollock, cod, and arrowtooth, respectively) fisheries in the Bering 
Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) region of Alaska as a case study.  Between 1990 and 2010, 
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estimates of the pollock and cod population have declined by 21% and 30%, respectively, 
while estimates of the arrowtooth population have increased by 109% over the same time 
period.  The biological interactions between these three species can be characterized by 
both arrowtooth and cod preying on pollock, and cod and arrowtooth competing with one 
another for food and other resources.  This is a simplification of reality as both pollock 
and cod have shown cannibalistic behavior towards their young, and juvenile pollock, 
cod and arrowtooth are all prey for adult pollock, cod and arrowtooth [17-19].   
Aydin et al. [20] found for the years 1980-1985 that the two keystone species in 
the Eastern Bering Sea were pollock and cod, while a more recent study between 1990 
and 1993 has shown the role of cod to be in decline, while pollock maintains its central 
role in the Bering Sea ecosystem [17, 20, 21].  A major predator of pollock is the 
arrowtooth flounder which was estimated in  2003 to account for approximately half of 
pollock consumption [22].  The increase in the arrowtooth flounder population and 
predation upon pollock is believed to be responsible for the decline in pollock stocks 
since the early 1990s [17, 21, 23].  This decline has occurred even as the total population 
of pollock predators has decreased over that period, largely due to decreases in the cod 
population [24].  As Pacific cod and arrowtooth flounder compete for pollock and other 
prey species, it is not surprising that the recent decline in the cod population has been 
matched by an increase in the arrowtooth flounder population.  The nature of these 
interactions is estimated empirically in section 3.1 using a reduced form multispecies 
surplus production model of stock dynamics. 
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1.3 The Fisheries 
 There are three different types of vessels operating in these three fisheries 
utilizing five different gear types.  The first type of vessel is motherships that do not 
catch any fish themselves, but rather act as a floating processor that accepts deliveries 
from catcher vessels.  Second, catcher processors (CPs) both catch and process their 
catch while at sea and typically take trips lasting a few weeks.  Finally, catcher vessels 
(CVs) catch fish at sea and deliver to onshore processors, motherships, or, occasionally, 
catcher processors.  They typically take trips lasting one day to a week or more.  CPs are 
larger than their equivalent geared CV, and processing their catch onboard allows them to 
stay at sea longer because their catch has been processed into a more stable form.  This 
also allows them to travel further distances and harvest in less dense species aggregations 
where the potential for non-target catch is much lower.   
This study focuses on ex-vessel revenues and costs of the harvesting of fish, and 
therefore treats the mothership sector like any onshore processor, excluding them from 
the analysis.  The CP boats tend to be larger in size than the CVs and average 156 feet in 
length and 938 gross tons in this study, while the CVs average 86 feet in length and 159 
gross tons.  The extra capacity for the CPs allow them to stay at sea longer than the CVs 
and travel further to find better fishing areas, which would be unprofitable for the CVs.   
 Currently, the five gear types used in these fisheries are jig, longline, non-pelagic 
(bottom) trawl, pot, and pelagic (mid-water) trawl.  Pollock is currently only targeted 
using pelagic trawl gear by both CVs and CPs.  Cod is targeted by all gear types except 
pelagic trawls.  Jig harvests of cod are small relative to other gear types and have no CP 
sector.  Therefore jig gear is excluded from the analysis.  Both CVs and CPs use the 
remaining four gear types in various amounts to catch cod as dictated by their gear 
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specific quota allocations.  Arrowtooth does not have a target fishery in the BSAI, but is 
caught incidentally by both CVs and CPs using pelagic and non-pelagic trawl and 
longline gear.   
 Each gear type represents a fundamentally different harvesting technology.  
Longline vessels catch fish by floating a longline of baited hooks anchored to the sea 
floor.  These longlines can be up to a mile in length, and are typically left out at sea for 
approximately 24 hour soak time before retrieval.  Vessels often have multiple longlines 
in the water at the same time, which are retrieved with a power wench.  Pot vessels are 
similar to longline vessels, but are equipped with metal cages (pots) instead of longlines.  
These pots are attached to buoys on the surface, and are retrieved after a multiple day 
soak with a power wench.  Location and bait choice determine the mix of catch of both 
longline and pot vessels.  These two vessel types are similar enough that a longline vessel 
could, with access to enough pots, also be used for crabbing, and vise versa.   
 Trawl vessels represent a different type of harvesting technology, and it is rare 
that a vessel would be flexible enough to do both trawling as well as pots or longlines.  
Trawlers catch fish by towing a cone shaped net, which vary in mesh size, through a 
dense aggregation of fish.  The fish are then brought aboard ship via a large stern (rear) 
ramp using a very large wench and power drum.  Most pelagic trawl nets have doors on 
the front of the net to hold it open.  The non-pelagic trawl nets also have a heavy 
weighted chain or bar at the bottom of the net opening which is meant to keep the net 
near the ocean floor.  Pelagic trawl vessels are able to adjust their species composition by 
the use of sonar and other fish finding technologies to target large pollock aggregations 
and have a low catch rate of non-pollock species relative to the bottom trawls.  Bottom 
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trawls use the same fish finding technologies to target individual species, but their target 
species do not aggregate in large masses above the seafloor like pollock.  As their targets, 
such as cod, live on the ocean floor along with halibut, rockfish, sablefish, and many 
different flounder species, the bottom trawls are less able to control their species mix.   
 Once onboard a catcher processor, it does additional processing to its catch.  This 
could be as simple as bleeding the fish, or as complicated as the production in a 
shorebased processing plant.  The CP longine and CP non-pelagic trawl vessels typically 
only head and gut their catch, and are much less sophisticated than the CP pelagic trawl 
vessels.  The CP pelagic trawl vessels have nearly identical processing equipment to a 
shorebased processor.  After a trawl net is hauled in, it is dumped into a holding tank and 
the fish are put through a sorter, which sorts the fish by size.  The pollock are then put 
through the filleting machine which able to remove and separate the fillets, roe sacks, and 
innards with relative accuracy.  Depending on the relative price of final products, some of 
the fillets will be put in the surimi press and processed into surimi.  The leftover from the 
filleting machine will have its oils extracted.  The fish oil is retained either for sale or for 
use in the boiler, depending on the relative prices of fish oil and diesel fuel.   After the oil 
has been captured, the final product will be put through the fish meal line, and will be 
sold as fish meal.  Nearly all, if not all, of a CP pelagic trawl vessel’s catch will be 
transformed into a finished product for sale.   
1.3.1. Walleye Pollock 
 The pollock fishery represents over 40% of global whitefish production, and is the 
largest fishery in North America by volume [21].  Between 2005 and 2009, the BSAI 
pollock harvest averaged 1.23 million tons with an average ex-vessel value of $380 
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million [21, 25, 26].  Pollock are processed into three forms: fillets, whole (head and 
gutted), and surimi (ground walleye pollock fillets that are used in fish sticks and 
imitation crab meat among other products).  Each form holds a relatively even market 
share.  An important component of the fishery is the production of pollock roe during the 
pollock A season (January-March).  The second or B season, which does not include roe, 
is open from approximately June through October.  Both seasons operate under a total 
allowable catch (TAC) quota, with 40% of the total annual pollock TAC allocated to the 
A season and 60% to the B season.   
 Historically, the walleye pollock fishery was exploited by foreign vessels until the 
advent of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1977 through the passage of the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (MSA) [21, 27].  
As a result, U.S. vessels began fishing for pollock in 1980 and were able to catch 99% of 
the quota by 1987.  The fishery remains dominated by domestic vessels.  The next major 
regulatory event was the so-called Inshore/Offshore Decision which affected the fishery 
after 1992.  After 1992, and continuing through 1998, the inshore/offshore TAC is 
determined by subtracting 4-6 percent for bycatch allowances and 7.5 percent for the 
community development quota (CDQ) from the TAC for the entire fishery.  The 
remainder of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands pollock TAC is allocated 65 percent to 
the offshore sector (those vessels not delivering to an on-shore processor) and 35 percent 
to the inshore sector [28].   
 The passage of the American Fisheries Act (AFA) in 1998 drastically changed the 
pollock fishery.  The CDQ was increased to 10 percent, the offshore allocation was 
reduced to 50 percent, and foreign flagged vessels were completely removed from the 
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offshore sector.  The offshore allocation (50%) was divided with 36.6 percent to catcher 
processor vessels, 3.4 percent to catcher vessels delivering to catcher processor vessels, 
and 10 percent to motherships and their catcher vessels [29].   
 The AFA also provided for the establishment of the Pollock Conservation 
Cooperative (PCC).  As a result, nine cooperatives were formed consisting of one catcher 
processor cooperative, a single mothership cooperative, and seven catcher vessel 
cooperatives (one for each on-shore processor).3  These cooperatives are allocated their 
share of the TAC based mostly upon the historical harvest of their participant vessels.  
The process of quota allocation among vessels within a cooperative is unknown, but is a 
potential area for future research.   
1.3.2.  Pacific Cod 
 Pacific cod accounts for the second largest groundfish harvest in the BSAI 
averaging 0.183 million tons over the period 2005-2009 with an average ex-vessel value 
of $148 million.  Pacific cod is a major predator of pollock in the wild.  The Japanese 
began harvesting Pacific cod via longline in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) area 
in the 1960’s for the frozen fish market.  In 1964 they began trawling for pollock with 
Pacific cod as an important bycatch species.  On occasion, cod became a target species 
for these vessels when high concentrations were found during pollock fishing [24].  This 
fishery was also dramatically impacted by the passage of the MSA in 1976.  By 1981 a 
U.S. and joint venture fishery began operations.  While the foreign and joint venture fleet 
dominated catches until 1989, they were completely displaced by 1991 by the domestic 
fishery, which currently catches cod with trawl, longline, pot, and jig gear.   
                                                 
3 NOAA Regional Office - http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/ram/afa.htm.   
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 The number of seasons and season length for Pacific cod varies by gear type.  
Fishing with hook and line gear and jig gear is open year round with two and three 
seasons, respectively.  Pot gear has two seasons and is closed during the summer between 
June 10 and September 1st.  Trawl gear has three seasons and is closed during the winter 
between November 1 and January 20th.   
 The TAC also varies by gear type.  Similar to the pollock fishery, 10.7 percent of 
the TAC is allocated to the CDQ, and the remaining 89.3 percent is allocated among the 
gear types.  Hook and line catcher vessels receive 2.2%, hook and line catcher processors 
receive 48.7%, jig vessels receive 1.4%, pot catcher vessels receive 8.4%, pot catcher 
processors receive 1.5%, trawl catcher vessels receive 22.1%, AFA trawl catcher 
processors receive 2.3%, and non-AFA catcher processors receive 13.4%.  The TAC for 
each gear type is also allocated differently across seasons, which are not described here. 
1.3.3.  Arrowtooth Flounder 
 Arrowtooth is a low value species with no target fishery.  It is caught primarily 
with both types of trawls and longline gear participating in the cod and pollock fisheries 
and is largely discarded when caught.  The average exploitation rate of arrowtooth 
flounder in the BSAI between 2000 and 2010 was only 1.5% of the stock size, and only 
20% of the TAC from 2008 and 2010.  Catches averaged almost 13,000 tons between the 
years 1977 and 2010, but catches are increasing in recent years.  The 2010 catch of 
almost 15,000 tons was less than ten percent the allowable biological catch (ABC) of 
156,300 tons, and less than twenty percent of the TAC of 75,000 tons [23].  This outcome 
is explained by the lack of arrowtooth flounder as a target species and high discard rates 
that decrease recorded total landed amounts.  Amendment 80 to the BSAI fisheries 
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management plan (FMP) was implemented in 2008 and aimed to reduce bycatch in the 
non-AFA CP non-pelagic trawl fleet.  It has resulted in increased retention rates above 
75% in 2008-2009, despite averaging of 14% over the period 1985-1999.  However, the 
largest discards of arrowtooth flounder still occur in the Pacific cod fishery and other 
flatfish fisheries via trawl and longline gear [23].   
 A major reason why arrowtooth has not developed a targeted fishery is that once 
landed, a parasite attached to the arrowtooth excretes an enzyme which softens the flesh 
and makes it unpalatable for human consumption [30].  The texture of its flesh has been 
described as “fish oatmeal.”  However, recently a number of food grade additives have 
been developed that inhibit the enzymatic breakdown of the flesh, and a small scale 
targeted fishery has developed in the Gulf of Alaska where arrowtooth flounder is the 
largest biomass component of the ecosystem [17, 30, 31].  As the current catches are far 
below the current TACs, and are extremely below the ABC, there is a potential to 
substantially increase the harvesting of arrowtooth in the BSAI if vessels find it 
profitable.  However, at the current time it does not appear to be very profitable, and thus 
no target fishery exists in the BSAI.   
1.3.4. Interactions among Fisheries 
 Unfortunately for fishery managers, ecological interactions are not the only 
interactions that need to be taken into account in multispecies fisheries management.  
Fishing with non-specific gear, such as trawls, results in significant incidental catch of 
non-target species.  Nearly all of the Bering Sea pollock and arrowtooth flounder are 
caught via trawl, and approximately one third of the Pacific cod catch is caught via trawls 
[25].  If vessel’s harvesting technology exhibits jointness in inputs, this implies that 
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separate production processes for each species do not exist, and vessels cannot alter their 
portfolio of harvests without costly adjustments.  Vessels could also exhibit economies of 
scope across multiple species where there are cost complementarities in the harvesting of 
multiple species such that it is cheaper to harvest multiple species than each one 
individually.  However, because some processors (particularly the catcher processor 
vessels) may be set up for only one species, vessels may prefer to keep harvests as 
homogenous as possible.  It is also possible that the cost of separating multiple species is 
high, and vessels could exhibit cost anti-complementarities or diseconomies of scope 
from catching multiple species on any given trip.  In these cases, vessels are likely to 
adjust their harvest among species by targeting different species on different trips in 
response to relative prices.   
 In addition to fishing with non-specific gear, some vessels in the BSAI switch 
gear to alter their expected portfolio of species caught.  Over half of the CVs using 
pelagic gear during the year switch to some other type of gear, mostly non-pelagic gear, 
during other parts of the year.  CPs are much less inclined to switch gear, but a good 
portion of CPs and CVs fish in both the BSAI and the Gulf of Alaska (GOA) during 
different parts of the year.  There are a number of CVs who also switch between 
harvesting cod with longlines as well as via pot gear.  These vessels are also generally 
involved in the BSAI crab fisheries using the pot gear during the crab season as well.  
Other longline vessels also harvest sablefish and halibut, primarily in the GOA, during 
other parts of the year when they are not targeting cod.  Non-pelagic trawl vessels 
typically target flat fish species (yellowfin and rock sole), rockfish, or Atka mackerel 
during other times of the year.  Generally, the only species caught with pelagic trawls is 
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pollock.  If vessels wanted to target other species, they would likely switch to a more 
effective technology for the other species.  The seasonality of these and other fisheries 
may also provide some incentives for vessels to switch gear and fisheries over the course 
of a year.  Many of the trawl vessels use pelagic gear to harvest pollock and then switch 
to non-pelagic trawl gear to harvest cod during a particular cod trawl season, but switch 
back to pelagic gear and harvest pollock during the more valuable pollock A season.  The 
adjustment of effort between these two species is likely to be a function of the relative 
prices and harvest costs of each species, relative abundance in the BSAI, and quota 
available to each vessel. 
   
1.4 Theoretical Motivation 
 Many bioeconomic models, such as those of Quirk and Smith [32] and Silvert and 
Smith [33], have modeled biological interactions as an externality inflicted by one species 
on another.  Hannesson [34] uses a predator-prey bioeconomic model and is able to 
derive a condition on the optimal harvest such that the rate of return on investing the 
additional rent from harvesting  a unit of species i must be equal to the rate of return on 
leaving that unit of species i in the sea.  With the exception of the studies by Singh and 
Weninger [11], Conrad and Adu-Asamoah [12], and Agar and Suitinen [35], these 
models focus solely on the biological interactions between species in an ecosystem.  By 
ignoring the technological interactions in a fishery, these models recommend policies that 
may be ineffective if firms cannot adequately adjust to the new regulations.  Squires and 
Kirkley [9] show that when faced with a trip quota on sablefish, firms cannot sufficiently 
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decrease their catch of sablefish.  Firms respond by discarding a large amount of 
sablefish at sea, thereby eliminating the purpose of the trip quota.   
 There have been only a few attempts to model empirically both the technological 
and biological interactions among fish species.  Singh and Weninger [11] use a 
simulation framework to explore the impact of scope economies and multispecies 
harvesting on discards in a multispecies bioeconomic model.  Flaaten [36, 37] and 
Sumaila [38] ignore the technological interactions among species and simulate these 
ecosystems based on the available biological information about each species and the 
interactions among species.  The implicit assumption of single species models is that 
harvests and stocks of one species do not affect the harvests of a different species.  
However, in many fisheries with combined harvesting of species, this is not true.  A 
perfect example is the pollock, cod, and arrowtooth flounder fishery in the BSAI where 
these species are fished jointly with the same non-specific gear throughout the year.   
 This study addresses two shortcomings found in previous fisheries literature.  The 
first is a lack of biological studies on which to base the biological stock dynamics and 
interaction parameters.  This issue is overcome by empirically estimating the growth and 
interaction parameters simultaneously for all species included in the model.  This 
empirical strategy is a departure from the literature [12, 36, 37, 39-42].  Typical studies 
estimate bioeconomic models using ordinary least squares estimation techniques, which 
results in consistent but inefficient estimates if there is correlation across equations.  The 
stock growth equations include growth parameters as well as stock interaction effects 
between species so that the interaction between species i and species j = 1,2,…,n – 1 are 
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taken into account.  Estimating the equations simultaneously allows the errors to be 
correlated across equations and the parameters to be estimated more precisely.     
By also estimating the naïve model without technological and biological 
interactions, this empirical strategy allows the calculation of additional benefits gained 
from multispecies management relative to single species management.  Therefore, by 
more precisely predicting the stock effects of harvesting, a more accurate model of the 
optimal harvesting of these species can be created to maximize the net present value of 
these resources.  This estimation strategy also allows for a better determination of which 
interdependencies—biological or technological—have a greater impact on the predictions 
of the model, the health of the resource stocks, and profits from the fishery.   
 The second unresolved issue in the previous fisheries literature is that ignoring the 
behavior of the harvesting sector may lead to perverse outcomes for fishery management 
[43].  This gap in the literature is addressed by using estimates of a flexible functional 
form of the firm’s technology to determine optimal harvests via a dynamic optimization 
problem.  Vessels are assumed to minimize the cost of harvesting their chosen output 
bundle.  As each gear type represents a different harvesting technology, cost functions 
and conditional input demand functions are estimated separately for each gear type on 
each trip using iterated seemingly unrelated regression.  Similarly, as CPs and CVs likely 
have different harvesting technologies for the same gear type, separate cost functions are 
estimated for each gear type used by each class of vessels.  With four gear types for each 
vessel class, a total of eight cost functions are estimated.  The parameters of the vessels’ 
cost functions are used in combination with the growth parameters to determine the 
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optimal harvest quota and stock at each point in time using the bioeconomic model, 
which is a unique feature of this study.   
 Using highly disaggregated harvest and cost data in addition to a time series of 
stock estimates, this study provides better estimates of each vessel’s technology than the 
previous empirical bioeconomics literature.  With better estimates of how these 
multiproduct fishing vessels transform multiple inputs into multiple outputs, the optimal 
harvests from the bioeconomic model take these interdependencies into account so as to 
avoid perverse outcomes.   
Allowing for biological and technological interactions is also more general than 
previous approaches, where single species management could be included as a special 
case if no biological or technological interactions exist in the fishery.  However, this 
study may not include all of the relevant biological and technological interactions 
occurring in this fishery.  Numerous other species are intentionally and unintentionally 
harvested in this fishery, which are not taken into account.  This study can therefore be 
viewed as a general multispecies fisheries model that can be expanded, conditional on the 
availability of data, to include other harvested and non-harvested species in an 
ecosystem-based fisheries management approach.  For example, this model could be 
expanded to examine the role of halibut and salmon bycatch limits on this fishery, which 
are also of direct policy relevance to fishery managers in Alaska.   
1.5 Data 
 This study uses data from 2006-2009 for all CVs and 2000-2010 for all CPs that 
had a trip in which arrowtooth, cod, and pollock combined accounted for at least 95% of 
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trip revenue.4  This requirement eliminated a number of non-pelagic trawl vessel trips in 
which cod was caught in combination with various flatfish species.  This was done to 
focus only on the three species in consideration for this study.  The landings data for the 
catcher vessels are taken from the Alaska Fisheries Information Network (AKFIN) 
database of fish tickets.  Fish tickets record the landings and value of all species caught 
(not only the three species of interest here), gear type, starting and ending trip dates, and 
the location of catch and port of delivery for each vessel trip selling the landings to a 
processor.  The fish tickets are filled out by the processor at the time of sale, and are 
corrected by the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) after the season to 
account for various bonuses that accrue to the catcher vessels such as their pollock roe 
bonuses.   
 CPs, however, do not sell their catch to another processor and thus generally do 
not have fish tickets to record their landings.  Therefore, the catcher-processor vessel data 
are taken from the Catch Accounting System (CAS), which is the official account of 
vessel catch.  The CAS uses information that the CPs submit in their Weekly Production 
Reports (WPR), which record weekly production statistics, and use accepted product 
recovery rates and observer information to calculate their weekly catch.  These two 
datasets provide information on all of the revenues from these vessels.   
The dataset consists of 177 CVs from 2006-2009 and 94 CPs from 2000-2010, 
both of which are unbalanced panels.  The fewest number of trips taken by CVs in the 
dataset is 1, and the maximum is 52.  The CPs operated a minimum of one week and a 
maximum of 50 weeks of the year.  The total number of usable CV trips is 5,172, 
                                                 
4 The first year that the crew size information was collected in the fish tickets was 2006.  During that year 
over 60% of trips did not include crew size on the fish ticket, and were thus excluded from the analysis.    
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including 179 longline vessel trips, 750 non-pelagic trawl vessel trips, 781 pot vessel 
trips, and 3,462 pelagic trawl vessel trips.  The total number of usable CP weeks is 
11,503, including 7,312 longline vessel weeks, 345 non-pelagic trawl vessel weeks, 398 
pot vessel weeks, and 3,448 pelagic trawl vessel weeks.   
 Three datasets include information about vessel characteristics.  These datasets 
come from the State of Alaska, the Federal vessel registration listing, and U.S. Coast 
Guard vessel registry database.  The vessel characteristics from the state of Alaska 
include length, year built, gross tonnage, net tonnage, horsepower, hold capacity, live 
hold capacity, refrigeration equipment, and fuel capacity.  The Federal vessel registration 
listing includes length and gross and net tonnage.  The Coast Guard vessel registry 
database includes length, gross and net tonnage, year built, horsepower, and vessel 
breadth and width.  The data from each source are slightly different, presumably due to 
errors in entering or reporting the data.  Therefore, the Coast Guard data are used unless 
the values for some of the variables appear to the author to be grossly incorrect, in which 
case values from the State of Alaska are used first, followed by values from the Federal 
database.    
 The only variable input used in this study is crew services, which is equal to the 
crew size times the number of days at sea for a given trip.  CPs are assumed to fish for a 
full 7 day week if they are at sea and submit a WPR.  Hourly wage data are taken from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ State Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates 
Annual survey for the Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations in Alaska and are 
deflated using the Consumer Price Index for Anchorage, AK.5  No reliable fixed cost 
                                                 
5 Other variable costs considered include fuel costs, but the amount of fuel used is not known.  Based on 
their harvest location and port of delivery, I have a rough idea of the distance they travel on each trip, but I 
18 
information on these vessels exist, and therefore, this study does not measure profit, but 
rather a proxy based on the net operating rent accruing to vessels in the fishery.    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
lack a mechanism to link distance traveled with fuel consumed.  I have some idea of the annual fuel costs 
of a very small subset of trawl vessels for 2003-2004, and did some regression analysis linking distance 
traveled to fuel consumed based on their vessel characteristics, but felt that it would likely be inappropriate 
to use these regression coefficients to predict fuel consumption outside this small sample with only one 
gear type.  Therefore, I have decided that it would introduce more error by including it in the analysis.   
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2. Bioeconomic Model 
 The problem this study solves is maximization of the discounted profits of the 
pollock, cod, and arrowtooth flounder fisheries in the Bering Sea over a 25 year time 
horizon with a terminal value function equal to a sustainable harvest at ending stock 
levels in perpetuity, subject to the species growth equations and quota constraints.  This 
problem is solved in two parts.  In the first stage, vessels minimize the cost of their 
chosen output bundle on each trip, and determine the profit maximizing number of trips 
to take with each gear type in a year given input and output prices and stock levels.  In 
the second stage, the fishery manager (social planner) determines the optimal annual 
quotas for each species given technological and biological interdependencies to maximize 
the net present value of the three-species fishery. 
2.1 Vessel Optimization 
This section examines the case of a single vessel in a given year, and therefore 
omits vessel and year subscripts that are added later.  Vessels are assumed to maximize 
their profits over the course of a single year by choosing their optimal portfolio of 
harvests on each trip t and the optimal number of trips for each gear type.  In the case of 
CPs, a trip represents an operating week of 7-day duration.  The number of trips a vessel 
takes with each gear type is a function of input and output prices, the annual quota for 
each species, its share of the quota for each species for each gear type, and fixed vessel 
characteristics.  Quota share allocated to each vessel for each gear type is assumed to be 
exogenous and fixed at the current levels because this is the way the regulator and 
industry have come to regard the allocation process.  However, it is not uniform across 
vessels, and is generally understood to be based on each vessel’s historical harvest of 
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each species with each gear type.  As quota are allocated for each gear type separately, 
the model assumes the decision of how many trips to take with each gear type in a given 
year is independent of the number of trips it takes with all other gear types.  Therefore, 
the model focuses on the annual decision of how many trips to take with each gear type 
rather than focusing on each discrete choice of which gear type to use on a given trip.   
This ignores the seasonality of the fishery, as each vessel chooses the optimal 
number of trips in each year based on annual prices and quota levels, fixed vessel 
characteristics, and fixed quota shares.  Therefore, the model does not address the intra-
annual variation in value from the different seasons in the pollock fishery, but rather 
addresses inter-annual changes in value from the pollock, cod, and arrowtooth fisheries.  
This model can thus be regarded as a combined count and continuous model, which is 
found by Smith [44] to provide better in sample and out of sample predictions of macro 
behavior than a discrete choice model of harvester behavior.  Thus, this model is more 
useful for long term projections of fish populations and profits from harvesting than the 
impacts of short term management actions.   
At the beginning of each year, stocks, quotas, quota shares, and input and output 
prices throughout the year are assumed known to the decision maker.  While a 
simplification, this is not entirely unrealistic.  The stock and quota levels are generally 
known in November, quota shares generally do not change, and as vessels are allocated 
quota they are able to contract with processors for the price of their catch throughout the 
year.  While prices may not be known exactly to the vessels, they must make their plans 
based on the best price information available.  The general level of prices is are 
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anticipated to a considerable degree of accuracy based on longer term variation in prices 
of these species and prices of other comparable global whitefish species.   
The conditions facing a given vessel in a given year on trip t, t = 1,…,T, are 
described by  
pt = (p1t,…,pnt) = a vector of output prices for species i = 1,…,n prevailing at trip 
t,  
wt = a vector of variable input prices prevailing at trip t,  
x = (x1,…,xn) = a vector of fish stocks by species i = 1,…,n in the current year,  
Z = a vector of fixed vessel characteristics,  
 1( ,..., )nq q q = a vector of aggregate annual quotas by species for the fisheries, 
ωg = (ωg1,…, ωgn) = a vector of shares of 1( ,..., )nq q q allocated to an individual 
vessel by gear type, g = 1,…,G, 
where pt, wt, and x are assumed to be strictly positive. The choices made for each vessel 
for each trip are described by  
zt = a vector of variable input quantities chosen for trip t,  
Tg = number of total trips planned for gear type choice g before switching gear 
types, g = 1,…,G,  
hgt = (hg1t,…,,hgnt) = a vector of harvested quantities of each species i = 1,…,n 
using gear type g at time t,  
where zt and hgt must be nonnegative.  The choices are constrained by gear- and species-
specific quotas described by  
qg,t+1 = qgt – hgt ≥ 0, g = 1,…,G; t = 1,…,T – 1;  
where  
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qgt = (q1gt,…,qngt) = a vector of remaining quotas by species and gear type at time 
t. 
The annual quotas for an individual vessel, i.e., the remaining quota at the beginning of 
the first time period, is thus represented equivalently in terms of ωg and q  such that an 
individual vessel’s annual quotas by species, i = 1,…,n, for gear type g are represented by  
 1 1( ,..., )g g gnq q qn     
where “*” denotes an element-by-element product. Replacing the vector of remaining 
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where ρ is the intra-annual discount factor, hlt ≡ 0 for all l ≠ g, and gC  is a cost function 
for gear type g defined by  
  ( | , , ) min | ( , , )
t
g gt t t t gt g t
z
C h w x Z w z h H z x Z  , 
                                                 
6 For convenience, transposition is not indicated when vectors are multiplied together as a dot product. 
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which is assumed convex in hgt, concave, non-decreasing, and linearly homogeneous in 
wt, and twice continuously differentiable in both.  Define as the harvest 
possibilities set for gear type g, which is assumed to be closed, bounded, non-empty, 
convex, and is contained in the positive quadrant for (x,zt).   
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where μt is a vector of the Lagrangian multipliers for the constraints that harvests must be 
less than or equal to unused quota allocations by species and gear type. Maximizing the 
Lagrangian produces optimal choices * ( , , , , , ),gt g gh h p w x Z q   and 
* ( , , , , ),g g gT T p w Z q   and an optimal value of the Lagrangian  
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Assuming that the optimal number of trips a vessel takes with each gear type, *gT , 
is continuous rather than discrete and further assuming an interior solution, the first order 
conditions with respect to the harvest of species i with gear type g at time   and the 
number of trips with gear type g can be expressed as  
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  (1.4) 
Using the envelope theorem, the marginal profit for an increase in the stock of species i 
and the marginal profit for an additional unit of aggregate quota for species i can be 
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 For purposes of social optimization, the optimal profit from the above annual 
vessel maximization problem using gear type g is denoted by  
 * ( , , , , , ).g p w x Z q   (1.8) 
    
2.2 Social Planner Optimization 
In the second stage, the social planner takes vessel profit maximizing behavior as 
given and chooses the optimal annual quotas in each year ( )yq  to maximize the net 
present value of the fishery where y indexes years.  In a given year, the social planner 
aggregates over all vessels, v = 1,…,Vg, and all gear types, g = 1,..,G, where Vg denotes 
the total number of vessels which have the potential to use gear type g.  The number of 
potential vessels for each gear type is fixed for all years of the model, and assumed equal 
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to the number of vessels that have used respective particular types of gear in the past.  
The social planner determines quotas based on  
R(x1y,…,xny) = a vector of surplus production (logistic) growth functions for each 
species, i=1,…,n, 
I(x1y,…,xny) = a vector of ecological interaction functions that determine how 
species interact in the ecosystem, i.e., predator, prey, competitive, 
symbiotic, etc., for each i=1,…,n, 
as well as py, wy, xy, Zv, and vg  where y subscripts are added to index years and v 
subscripts are added to index vessels.  Therefore, the maximized annual profit by gear 
type g for each vessel v in year y is denoted as  
* ( , , , , , )vgy y y y v y vgp w x Z q  . 
 Aggregating over all gear choices for a given vessel defines each vessel’s 
maximized annual profit as  




where  is a vector of quota shares for each gear type for vessel v.  
Total annual profits can be represented by aggregating the annual profits for each gear as 
 1 , ,v v v   
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p w x Z q
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   , 
where V is the total number of all vessels, and 1( ,..., )VZ Z Z  is the vector of fixed 
vessel characteristics for all vessels.   
 The optimal values of harvest on each trip for vessel v in year y comes from the 
maximization of the Lagrangian in equation (1.1) is defined as the vector 
 
* ( , , , , , )vgty vgt y y y v y vgh h p w x Z q  .   
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Similarly, maximization of the Lagrangian in equation (1.1) defines the optimal number 
of trips taken by vessel v with gear type g in year y represented by  
 * ( , , , , )vgy vg y y v y vgT T p w Z q  . (1.9) 
 Therefore, define the vector of optimal total harvest by species in year y as  










From the individual vessel’s problem, the vector of optimal total harvests is equal to the 
annual quota less the unused quota left over after the last trip, such that: 
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where  is the vector of quota for gear type g remaining after vessel v takes its 
final trip in year y with gear type g.  For this analysis, quota constraints for each species 
are assumed to be binding in each year , which is 
certainly the case in the pollock and cod fisheries, but is not likely to hold for the 
arrowtooth flounder fishery.  The role of the arrowtooth flounder quota, harvests, and a 
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4.   
The problem of maximizing the total discounted profits of this three species 
fishery over a 25 year time horizon for the fishery manager can be written as follows:  
  * 1
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subject to the growth of each species, 
 , 1 ( ) ( ) , 1,..., ,i y i iy i y iyiyx = x R x +I x q i n     (1.11) 
where 1 (1 )    is the discount factor,   is the discount rate, Y = 25 years, p and w  
are the mean output and input prices for the five years preceding the steady state, the 
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vector of quotas in the terminal period is equal to the vector of steady state growth for 
each species in the terminal period, 1 ( ) ( ), ..., ( ) ( )(Y i iY i Y n nY n Yq R x +I x R x +I x ) , and 
1( , , , , , )Y YTV p w x Z q    is the terminal value function.  The growth equations imply that 
the stock of species i in the following year is a function of the stock i in the current year, 
the density-dependent growth as a function of the current stock level, the growth from 
ecological interactions which is a function of the current stock of all species, and the 
annual quota for species i which is assumed to be completely harvested. 
 At the end of the time horizon, input and output prices, andw p  respectively, are 
set to their mean of the five years prior to the steady state to reduce the dependence of the 
terminal value function on the stochastic elements which determine prices in each period.  
The terminal value function is equal to the rent from harvesting sustainable harvest levels 
for each species at the terminal stock value in perpetuity.  Setting   and 
solving for the harvest:  
, 1 , 0i Y i Yx x  
 , 1 , 1 ( ) ( )i Y i Y i iY i Yh q R x +I x   , (1.12) 
where , represents the harvest of species i at the end of the time horizon.  The 
terminal value function is then equal to:  




1( ) ( )( , , , , , ) ( , , , , , )
Y
Y i iY i Y Y Y YTV p w x Z R x +I x p w x Z q









1 , 1 , 1
1
1
* ( ) ( )
( , , , , , )
( ) ( )
( , , , , , )
y y y y yY
SP y
n
y i y iy i iy i y iy i y
i
Y
Y Y i iY i Y
L
p w x Z q
x R x I x q x







   









where the λiy are Lagrangian multipliers for the stock constraints. The first-order 
necessary conditions for a maximum are: 
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Rearranging, and simplifying the first order necessary conditions obtains  
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in the left hand side of equation (1.19) obtains: 
 
* * *1
1,..., , .1 ,
n
y y y ji i
iy
j iiy iy iy iy jy iy
i n i
IdR I






          
                             
  (1.21) 









y y y ji i
i y
j ii y i y i y i y j y i y
i n i j
IdR I






     
 
          
                             
  (1.22) 
and substituting equation (1.22) on the right hand side of equation (1.18) thus implies 
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  (1.23) 
 Equation (1.23) is the multi-species Euler equation including both biological and 
technological interactions between species, which states that the marginal profit from an 
additional unit of quota for species i (the left hand side) should be equal to the discounted 
marginal profit of an additional unit of quota for species i next period (the right hand 
side).  The first term in brackets on the right hand side is the discounted marginal profit 
from an additional unit of species i next period on next period profits.  The second term 
in brackets on the right hand side is the discounted marginal value of an additional unit of 
quota (which is assumed to be equal to the marginal value of an additional unit harvested) 
next period times the marginal growth rate of the stock that was allowed to grow from 
year y to y+1.  The third term represents the impact of the unharvested unit interacting 
with the other species for an additional period that may lead to increases or decreases in 
the stock of other species, which is multiplied by the marginal profit of harvesting those 
species next period.   
 Assuming a steady state  , 1 , 1 0 ,i y iy i y iy ,x x i      y  the first order 
conditions can be rewritten as 
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Setting equation (1.24) equal to equation (1.25) results in a modified multispecies golden 
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 (1.27) 
Equation (1.27) states that the marginal profit from an additional unit of quota for species 
i (the left hand side) should be equal to the marginal profit from leaving that unit of 
species i in the sea (the right hand side).  The first term in the numerator on the right hand 
side is the marginal profit from increasing the stock next period through lower harvesting 
costs.  As the profit function represents the profit from the harvest of all three groundfish 
species, the derivatives of the profit function incorporate the technological interactions 
between species in the firm’s profit maximizing behavior.  The other terms in the 
numerator each represent the marginal profit of an additional unit of quota for species j 
times the marginal interaction effect of not harvesting another unit of species i on species 
j.  The numerator on the right hand side is weighted by how the net growth rate of species 
i is related to the discount rate.    
 The envelope conditions of the individual vessel’s problem from equations (1.5) 




























where  is the Lagrangian for vessel v using gear type g at time t and is vessel v’s 
cost function for gear type g.  The optimal annual profits for the fishery 
vgtL vgC
*( y )  is equal to 
the optimal Lagrangian value in a given year aggregated over all vessels, gear types and 
trips , which can be represented as *( vgtyL )
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Ignoring the year subscripts and substituting these expressions into equation (1.27) results 
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 Equation (1.28) is the fully specified multispecies golden rule for this fishery 
which includes both the biological and technological interdependencies between different 
species harvested by any number of vessel classes and gear types.  The term on the left 
hand side is the marginal profit per trip weighted by the quota share allocated to each 
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vessel and gear type and aggregated over all vessels, trips and gear types.  On the right 
hand side, the first term is the marginal cost reduction for a change in the stock of species 
i aggregated over all vessels, trips and gear types.  The second term in the numerator is 
the marginal profit per trip weighted by the quota share allocated to each vessel and gear 
type aggregated over all vessels, trips, and gear types from an additional unit of quota for 
species j times the marginal interaction effect of an additional unit of species i on the 
stock of species j.   
 Solving equation (1.28) for the discount rate results in the most general version of 
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Equation (1.29) is the fundamental equation of multi-species renewable resources, where 
the single species case is included as a special case.  Equation (1.29) states that the 
discount rate should be equal to the marginal net growth rate of the biological resource 
(the numerator) divided by the marginal stock effect, which measures the value of a 
marginal unit of stock relative to the marginal value of quota [46].  This equality states 
that a dollar invested in the fish stock (the right hand side) should achieve the same rate 
of return as a dollar invested elsewhere in the economy (the left hand side).   
 Revisiting equation (1.23), the multispecies Euler equation, and substituting the 
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Equation (1.30) has the same interpretation as equation (1.23).  That is, the marginal 
profit from increasing the quota today (harvesting today) should be equal to the 
discounted value of increasing the quota (harvesting) next period, where the 
technological interdependencies between species are made more explicit.   
 The multispecies golden rule determines whether a unit of species i should be 
harvested or left in the ocean to grow until next period.  It is interesting to note how the 
optimal quotas differ between equation (1.28) and the single species version of the golden 
rule.  If there are complementarities (anti-complementarities) in the production of these 
three species, then the marginal profit from harvest (the left hand side) is larger (smaller) 
when technological interactions are included than in the single species case.7  Given the 
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 q q      In the single species case, 
0ig igC h    , while if there are cost complementarities, this implies that 
2 0ig ig jgC h h     , 
which means that marginal profits are higher when these species are caught together rather than separately.    
The reverse is true for cost anti-complementarities, such that 2 0ig ig jgC h h     , which implies that 
marginal profits are lower when species are caught together.   
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same underlying technology and convexity of the profit function in the stock, larger 
(smaller) marginal profits indicate that the optimal steady state stock is greater (less) in 
the multispecies case including technological interactions than in the single species case.  
This pattern is consistent for all species that exhibit complementarities in production. 
 To examine how ecological interactions affect the optimal quotas, consider the 
case of arrowtooth flounder, which prey on pollock but compete with cod for resources, 
0j arth .I x    j   Assuming positive profits in the pollock and cod fisheries, this leads 
to an decrease in the right hand side of equation (1.28), which means that the marginal 
profit from leaving a unit of arrowtooth in the water is less than the marginal profit from 
harvesting today.  This leads to a lower optimal arrowtooth population than the single 
species case.  As profits are likely positive both in the pollock and cod fisheries, 
including biological interactions leads to an unambiguous decrease in the optimal 
arrowtooth flounder population.   
 Equations (1.28), (1.29), and (1.30) are the fundamental marginal conditions for 
renewable resource management.  Equation (1.28) is the fully specified multi-species 
golden rule, which for the steady state, indicates that the marginal profit from an 
additional unit of quota for species i should be equal to the marginal profit from leaving 
that unit of species i in the sea.  In the steady state, equation (1.29) states that the rate of 
discount should be equal to the rate of return that is earned by investing in the fish stock.  
Equation (1.30) states that, even when not in the steady state, the marginal profit from 
increasing the quota by a unit today should be equal to the discounted value of increasing 
the quota by a unit next period.  These three equations state the fundamental marginal 
conditions that must be satisfied for optimal renewable resource management: (i) the 
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value of harvest today should be equal to the value of harvest tomorrow, (ii) the value of 
a unit harvested is equal to the value of a unit left in the sea, and (iii) the rate of return 
earned on the fish stock is equal to the rate of return earned elsewhere in the economy.   
Chapter 3 focuses on empirically estimating the multispecies stock dynamics and vessel 
technology using numerical optimization techniques to determine the optimal quotas in 
this multispecies fishery.   
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3. Optimal Multispecies Harvesting in Biologically and Technologically 
Interdependent Fisheries 
3.1 Estimation of the Biological Stock Dynamics 
Stock estimates of each species and the catch on an annual basis are available for 
the years 1978 through 2010 through the Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation 
(SAFE) report from the Alaska Fisheries Science Center [21, 23, 24, 26].  The growth of 
each species is assumed to follow a discrete logistic function.  The parameters to be 
estimated are the intrinsic growth rate for each species (ri), a density dependent factor 
related to the carrying capacity ( )i , and the two interaction parameters between species 
.  The two interaction parameters are assumed to be equal to zero in the single 




(1.11) in the bioeconomic 
model, such that the surplus production growth function for species i is defined as 
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      (2.1) 
The same unobserved environmental, climate, and other factors that impact the 
growth of pollock likely also impact the growth of cod and arrowtooth flounder, which 
implies that the errors are correlated across growth equations.  Therefore, this system of 
three equations is estimated with iterative seemingly unrelated regression, which provides 
consistent and asymptotically efficient parameter estimates using the standard assumption 
that the errors are correlated across equations, but not across observations in each 
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equation.  After appending an error term, equation (2.1) is estimated for all three species 
using seemingly unrelated regression for the years 1978-2010. 
Parameter estimates of equation (2.1) are provided in Table 1.  Each species’ own 
stock parameters are as expected, leading to classical concave logistic growth curves.  
However, the interaction terms are not completely as expected.  For arrowtooth, the cod 
stock has a positive and statistically significant impact on growth while the pollock stock 
has a negative but marginally statistically significant (at the 10% level) impact on growth.  
Interestingly, the coefficient on the quadratic term ( )i for arrowtooth is not statistically 
significant.  This is likely due to the fact that the estimate of the stock has never declined 
for as long as data are available.  Therefore little curvature is evident to identify the 
coefficient on the quadratic term.  For cod, arrowtooth has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on growth, while pollock has a negative and marginally statistically 
significant (at the 10% level) effect on growth.  The interaction terms for pollock are of 
the expected sign, with arrowtooth having a statistically significant negative impact on 
pollock growth, while cod has a negative but statistically insignificant impact.   
These results suggest that increases in arrowtooth reduce the growth of the cod 
and pollock stocks, increases in the cod stock increase the growth of arrowtooth, and 
increases in pollock reduces the stocks of both arrowtooth and cod.  The negative 
coefficients between pollock and cod (acod,plck and aplck,cod) suggest a competing species 
relationship.  It is possible that the relationship between species changes at different life 
stages such that older cod prey on young pollock and older pollock prey on young cod as 
suggested by Jurado-Molina et al. [19].  As the coefficient on the cod/pollock interaction 
term for the pollock stock (aplck,cod ) is not statistically significant, while the cod/pollock 
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interaction term is marginally statistically significant at the 10% level for the cod stock 
(acod,plck), this suggests that the adult pollock predation on cod juveniles is the dominant 
predator-prey relationship.   
The multispecies model is compared with a single species model, which estimates 
the same growth function from equation (2.1), setting , 0 ,i ja i j  , such that:  
 2, 1 (1 ) , 1,..,
ss ss
i y i iy i iy iyx = r x x h i     n . (2.2) 
Table 2 presents the single species parameter estimates of equation (2.2), which is 
estimated via constrained linear regression independently for each species, constraining 
the coefficient on the harvest to be equal to one. Similar to the multispecies model, the 
estimated coefficients imply a standard concave logistic growth curve.  Interestingly, the 
multispecies intrinsic growth rates (ri) are larger for cod and pollock, but smaller for 
arrowtooth.  One possible explanation for this phenomenon would be if arrowtooth is 
relatively more dependent on prey availability than cod and pollock.  The coefficients in 
Table 2 also imply that the implied carrying capacity, / ,i ir   is larger for the single 
species model than the multispecies model for cod and pollock, but is over ten times 
smaller for arrowtooth.     
Using the parameters from Table 1 and Table 2, Figures 1-3 present a 
retrospective analysis of the population between 1978 through 2010 comparing the stock 
assessment model to the predicted values from the multispecies and single species models 
using the actual harvests over the period.  While not exact, both models appear to do a 
relatively good job of approximating the general trends in all three stocks, and should 
provide reasonable projections for simulating the stock dynamics in the bioeconomic 
model.  The multispecies model for all three species is superior to the single species 
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models relative to the stock assessment models as measured by comparing the sum of 
squared errors between the stock assessment model and the multispecies or single species 
models.  The multispecies model outperforms the single species models for arrowtooth, 
cod, and pollock by 21, 20, and 6 percent, respectively.   
While these estimates may not provide substantially different stock estimates in 
the retrospective analysis, Figures 4-6 show that the underlying growth functions are 
fundamentally different between the single and multispecies models.  For the 
multispecies model, the other species are assumed to be at their mean stock size for the 
study period, 1978-2010.  As discussed above, the single species models underestimate 
cod and pollock growth but overestimate arrowtooth growth at low stock levels.  These 
figures show that the cod and pollock carrying capacity are also larger in the single 
species model, while arrowtooth carrying capacity is smaller for the single species model 
than the multispecies model.  These two features imply that the maximum sustainable 
yield (MSY) for cod and pollock are achieved at lower stock levels in the multispecies 
model than in the single species model.  However, the MSY for arrowtooth is larger in 
the multispecies model than the single species model.   
These differing growth equations can have substantially different impacts on the 
dynamics in this system as arrowtooth has a substantial impact on the growth of cod and 
pollock in the multispecies model.  As each stock is linked in the multispecies model, and 
therefore each species’ growth is a function of the stock size of each other species, 
substantial increases in the stock of arrowtooth can reduce the growth of the two 
profitable species in this ecosystem.  If the multispecies model is the ‘true’ model, then 
using the single species model for cod and pollock management decisions will result in 
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quotas which are too high, and likely lead to stock depletion.  Also, using the single 
species model for arrowtooth will cause overly conservative quotas to be set, which will 
allow the stock of arrowtooth to increase leading to further depletion of the cod and 
pollock stocks.  The impact of multispecies and single species biological growth 
functions on the optimal solution is explored in section 3.5.   
3.2 Estimation of Vessel Profits 
Vessels are assumed to maximize profits each year according to their profit 
maximization problem from section 2.1, where vessels choose their optimal harvests on 
each trip, and the optimal number of trips to take with each gear type for the year.  The 
differences in vessel type, crew size, and onboard equipment between catcher vessels and 
catcher-processors likely lead to different profit maximizing behavior.  Similarly, as 
different gear types can expect to harvest a different portfolio of catches, each gear type 
is a fundamentally different harvesting technology.  Therefore, the sample is stratified by 
the four major gear types used in these fisheries (longline, non-pelagic trawl, pot, and 
pelagic trawl) for each class of vessel (CV and CP) for a total of eight gear types for 
estimation.  From section 2.1, a vessel’s annual profits from gear type g can be expressed 
as: 
*
* *( , , , , , ) ( | , , )
vgT
vg vg vg vg
t




  , which is the sum of trip level 
profits (in braces), discounted by the intra-annual discount rate  , and summed over all 
trips with gear type g.   
Empirically, estimation of the vessel’s annual profits is split in two parts using 
data from 2006 to 2010 for CVs and 2000 to 2010 for CPs that caught any amount of 
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arrowtooth, cod, or pollock.8  First, the vessel-class-trip level cost functions, 
 are estimated using a flexible functional form for each gear type.  
Subsequently, each vessel’s trip level data is aggregated to the annual level, and the 
number of trips a vessel takes with each gear type is estimated, assuming the number of 
trips taken follows a Poisson distribution.
*( | , , )vg vgC h w x Z  ,
9   
3.2.1. Estimation of the Trip Level Cost Function 
 
 A number of inputs in the production of fish are fixed at the vessel level, such as 
vessel characteristics and the population of each species, which suggests a restricted cost 
function is most appropriate for estimation.  Ignoring the time and vessel subscripts, let 
 be a quadratic approximation to the restricted cost function for vessel v using gear 
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where , and represents the ith column of the matrix.  Define [ , , , ]vg vg vw h x ZX ivgX vgX
gV to be the number of observations using gear type g, w is a gV by M matrix of variable 
input prices, is an vgh gV by n matrix of harvest quantities, x is an gV by n matrix of given 
stock levels of the species of interest, and Zv is an gV by k matrix of given vessel 
characteristics, so is an vgX gV by 2n + M + k matrix.  Using Shephard’s Lemma, the 
derivative of the cost function with respect to the mth input price is equal to the 
conditional input demand: 
                                                 
8 The shorter time series for CVs is due to the fact that crew size was not collected in the data prior to 2006.   
9 Only vessels that have used a particular gear type between 2006 and 2009 for CVs or 2000 and 2010 for 
CPs are included in the estimation of the number of trips with that gear type.  All other vessels are assumed 
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 The restrictions that must be placed on the parameters to insure symmetry of the 







 and the restrictions 
required for linear homogeneity in input prices are:   and  g = 
1,…,G.  These restrictions assure the convenient theoretical conditions of symmetry and 
adding up of the cost function.  This specification also allows for the testing of a series of 
hypotheses such as whether production of multiple outputs is joint or whether there are 
cost complementarities.  Estimating the conditional input demand equations in addition to 
the cost function for each gear type increases the effective degrees of freedom for 
estimation by imposing cross-equation parameter constraints, and allows for testing 
hypotheses on the structure of the vessel’s technology such as jointness in inputs or 










 The data used in this study are described in section 1.5.  The variable input used 
as a proxy for vessel effort is the amount of crew services (number of crew multiplied by 
the trip length in days).  The price included in is an hourly wage for farming, fishing, 
and forestry occupations in Alaska
vgX
]vZ
10 multiplied by eight hours per day and trip length.11   
Other regressors included in  include the harvest of arrowtooth, cod, 
and pollock, the annual stock size of arrowtooth, cod, and pollock, and the three given 
vessel characteristics of length, horsepower, and gross tonnage.  After appending an error 
term for econometric purposes to the cost function and the conditional input demand 
[ ; ; ;vg vgw h xX
                                                 
10 These data are taken from the annual Bureau of Labor Statistics State Occupational Employment and 
Wage Estimates.   
11 Recall that CPs are assumed to fish a full 7-day week if they are submitting a WPR.   
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equations and a vessel-gear fixed effect to the cost function, the system of equations (2.3) 
and (2.4) are estimated using iterated seemingly unrelated regression.   
 The results are presented in Table 3 for CVs and Table 4 for CPs.  Coefficients 
with no estimate in Tables 3 and 4 were excluded from the estimation.  CV longline, CV 
pot, and CP pot only catch cod; thus, the stocks and harvests of arrowtooth and pollock as 
well as their interactions are excluded from the estimation of equations (2.3) and (2.4).  
For the other gear types, some of the stock interaction terms are excluded due to 
multicollinearity.  With only 4 years of data for the CVs, there are only 4 unique stock 
values for each species, which vary together.  Variation in the data is not sufficient to 
identify these parameters, causing serious collinearity problems if all interaction terms in 
equation (2.3) are included.  As the CPs have 10 years of usable data, additional, but not 
all, stock interaction terms can be included.   Given a longer time series of data this may 
be possible.   
For CV non-pelagic trawl and CV pelagic trawl, the linear stock variables are 
included in equation (2.3), but all stock interaction terms are excluded.  Therefore, these 
equations capture only the first-order effects of all three stocks on the cost of harvesting, 
rather than the effect of the target stock and its interactions.  For the CPs, with additional 
years of data, in addition to the linear stock terms of all three species, the target species 
interaction terms are also included to allow some flexibility in the stock of the target 
species.  Therefore, for CP longline and CP non-pelagic trawl, the cod stock squared 
along with the cod stock multiplied by the input price, harvest of all three species, and 
vessel characteristics are included.  CP pelagic trawls are estimated similarly using the 
pollock stock and its interactions instead of the cod stock.   
44 
 From Shephard’s Lemma, the derivative of the cost function with respect to input 
prices is equal to the conditional input demand, which implies in Tables 3 and 4 that the 
coefficients of the conditional input demand equation are those interaction terms that 
have names beginning with w.  Coefficient names represent the subscripts of the   
coefficients in equation (2.3) and equation (2.4), where coefficient names separated by 
“,” represent cross product terms. 
 The results in Tables 3 and 4 show that the coefficient on the squared input price 
term w,w is negative for all CV and CP gear types and highly significant for all gear types 
other than CV longline gear.  Thus, the estimated conditional input demand for crew 
service hours is downward sloping in its own price, as expected.  Therefore, all gear types 
are concave in input prices with the exception of CP longline vessels.   
 All gear types, with the exception of those assumed to only harvest cod (CV 
longline, CV pot, CP pot) are found to exhibit some form of jointness in inputs.12  
Jointness in inputs is tested using a Wald test of an equivalence of the coefficients: 
 [, ,i j i jg g  g,h h h h 47].  CV non-pelagic trawl are found to exhibit overall jointness in 
inputs, CV pelagic trawl exhibit jointness for the harvesting of arrowtooth and for 
harvesting pollock, as well as overall jointness in inputs.  CP longline are found to exhibit 
both jointness in cod harvest and overall jointness, CP non-pelagic trawl only exhibit 
jointness in the catch of arrowtooth and cod, and CP pelagic-trawl exhibit weak jointness 
for arrowtooth harvest and overall jointness (at the 10 percent level) but highly 
significant jointness for harvesting pollock.   
                                                 
12 Results of these tests are available from the author upon request.   
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As CV trawl vessels are less able to make profitable trips traveling large distances 
than the CP trawl vessels, it is not surprising that both CV pelagic trawl and CV non-
pelagic trawl both exhibit jointness in inputs.  As CP trawl vessels are able to travel 
further distances from port and harvest profitably in less dense aggregations, it is not 
surprising that they still exhibit jointness, but to a lesser degree than the CV trawls.  CP 
longlines also exhibit jointness which is not surprising given how their gear sits near the 
sea floor which is home to both arrowtooth and pollock at certain life stages.   
The lack of significance some of the species could be a result of crew services 
serving as a poor proxy for the true costs of harvesting in this fishery.  Fuel usage is 
likely to be an additional large contributor to costs, but this information is not available.  
This result could also be a result of a lack of reporting of species which were discarded at 
sea (although vessels are required to record all species harvested).  Surprisingly, the non-
pelagic trawl gear types did not show as much jointness in inputs as would be expected 
for bottom trawl gear, which may be a result of excluding other species, particularly 
flatfish, which are caught when these vessels are targeting cod.  Lastly, it is possible that 
the lack of jointness in inputs is a result of a concerted effort by the North Pacific 
Fisheries Management Council (NPFMC) to reduce incidental catch of non-target species 
in their fishery management plans.  In particular, the American Fisheries Act (AFA) 
limits the ability of vessels participating in the pollock fishery from expanding their effort 
in other fisheries.  Similarly, Amendment 80 to the BSAI FMP limits non-AFA CP non-
pelagic trawl vessels from expanding their harvesting in other fisheries as well.   
Surprisingly, only one vessel-class/gear-type combination exhibits statistically 
significant cost complementarities, while eight exhibit statistically significant cost anti-
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complementarities.  Cost complementarities (anti-complementarities) between species i 
and j can be tested using a one sided t-test of whether the coefficient  is less 
(greater) than zero.  The other six vessel-class/gear-type combinations exhibit no 
statistically significant cost complementarities.  CV pelagic trawls are found to exhibit 
cost complementarities between arrowtooth and cod as the coefficient on harth,hcod in 
i jg,h h

Table 3 is negative and statistically different from zero, but cost anti-complementarities 
between arrowtooth and pollock and cod and pollock as the coefficients on harth,hplck and 
hcod,hplck are positive and statistically significant.  CV non-pelagic trawls exhibit cost anti-
complementarities between cod and pollock and weak anti-complementarities between 
arrowtooth and pollock.  CP longline vessels exhibit cost anti-complementarities between 
all three species combinations.  CP non-pelagic trawls exhibit cost anti-
complementarities between cod and pollock.  The cost anti-complementarities may be a 
result of vessels having to expend extra effort separating species when they catch 
multiple species before they are landed.  In the case of the CPs, adjusting processing gear 
to account for different sized fish of the same species is costly, and accounting for 
multiple species is likely more costly.   As many of these gear types exhibit cost anti-
complementarities, harvesting each species separately would be less costly, but with 
jointness in inputs, the harvesting technology does not allow them to harvest each species 
separately without incurring additional costs.   
The estimated cost functions presented in Table 3 and Table 4 are used to 
determine the cost of harvesting each vessel’s allocated catch.  Each vessel’s share of the 
quota is determined by their historical catch between 2007 and 2009 for each gear type 
such that each gear is allocated its historical percentage of each species so that the shares 
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sum to one.  For each gear type, the vessel gear share is determined by each vessel’s own 
historical harvest of each species by gear type.  As the cost functions estimated above are 
trip/week level functions, it is now necessary to estimate the number of trips taken or 
weeks operated with each gear type during a given year to catch the amount of species for 
each gear type each vessel is allocated.   
3.2.2. Estimation of Total Annual Trips and Operating Weeks  
Recall from equation (1.9) that the number of trips or weeks operating in these 
fisheries is a function of input and output prices, the annual harvest allocated to each 
vessel/gear combination, the annual TAC level, and fixed vessel characteristics.  The 
number of trips that a CV takes or the number of weeks a CP operates with a particular 
gear type is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution, such that:  
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Maximum likelihood estimates of the g  coefficients for each gear type are presented in 
Table 5 for CVs and Table 6 for CPs.  As the harvests included in  are gear specific, 
only the harvests using the same gear are used to determine the number of trips or 
operating weeks with each gear.   
ivgU
 Columns 1, 2, 3 of Table 5 and column 1 of Table 6 show that the price of cod 
and the quota for cod have a positive and statistically significant impact on the number of 
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trips/weeks taken by CV longline, CV non-pelagic trawl, CV pot, and CP longline gears, 
which is consistent with these gear types targeting cod.  However, columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 6 do not show a similar pattern for the CP non-pelagic trawls and CP pot gears.  CP 
non-pelagic trawl gear has negative and statistically significant coefficients on cod price 
and cod quota, while CP pot gear has a positive and statistically significant coefficient on 
cod price, and a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient on cod quota.  In 
contrast with the CVs, the CPs appear to determine the number of weeks they operate 
largely based on their annual catch. 
 Column 4 of Table 5 shows that the CV pelagic trawl vessels are clearly targeting 
pollock as both pollock price and pollock quota have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the number of trips taken.  Column 4 of Table 6 shows a slightly 
different picture for CP pelagic trawls.  These vessels are also clearly targeting pollock, 
but both the price of pollock and annual quota do not have a statistically significant 
impact on the weeks they operate and, similar to the other CPs, the number of operating 
weeks is largely a function of the harvest of each species.  The statistically insignificant 
coefficients on the price and quota for pollock for CP pelagic trawl vessels can be 
explained in a few ways.  First, the price used in this study is a vessel’s average price for 
each species weighted by the proportion of each product form.  So vessels may not be 
responding to the average price, but could be adjusting their harvesting to target smaller 
fish to process into surimi if the relative price of surimi is high, or to target larger fish to 
make fillets if their relative price rises.  These vessels are also operating within and are 
allocated quota by their Cooperative, which could make the relationship between annual 
quota and operating weeks less clear.  Also, since the passage of the AFA, these vessels 
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are limited from operating in other fisheries, and may not have many options outside of 
the pollock fishery.  So the number of weeks they operate may vary only by the quota 
they are allocated to catch by the Co-op.   
 The estimates for each vessel-class/gear-type combination are used to determine 
the number of trips each vessel takes over the course of a year in the numerical 
optimization as a result of changing prices, quotas, and individual annual harvests.  
Combining the number of trips each vessel takes with each gear type in a year, each 
vessel’s share of the total annual quota for each gear type, and the cost functions 
associated with their trip level harvest, the model can now calculate the total cost of 
harvesting any level of output.  The following section estimates an inverse demand model 
for all species jointly to provide estimates of the price impacts of increased harvesting.   
3.3 Estimation of the Inverse Demand Model for Outputs 
The stocks and harvests of pollock and cod are currently at fairly low levels, and 
are expected to rebound.  Therefore, rather than keep prices constant during the 
numerical optimization procedure, an inverse demand model was developed for each 
species to allow the market price of each species to respond to its supply.  The price of 
species i in year y (piy) is a function of the price of all other species in year y – 1 (pj,y-1), 
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The system of equations (2.7) is estimated with maximum likelihood assuming that the 
iy are normally distributed and contemporaneously correlated but serially independent.  
As the catch of each species is determined exogenously by the TAC for each species, this 
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demand system will not suffer from simultaneity bias.  To the extent that arrowtooth 
TAC is not fully harvested, simultaneity bias could be a concern, but as arrowtooth is 
largely sold as a component of fish meal, the bias is likely to be small.  The results are 
presented in Table 7.   
 The results suggest that all species have a downward sloping demand curve, 
although the estimated own price coefficient is statistically significant only for 
arrowtooth.  The lack of statistical significance on the coefficient on the catch of cod and 
pollock in the inverse demand model is likely due to both cod and pollock competing in a 
largely homogeneous global whitefish market.  While Alaska pollock are a substantial 
portion of the global whitefish market, any reduction in supply can be made up with 
increased production from other global capture fisheries such as orange roughy and the 
rebounding stock of Atlantic cod as well as from increasing aquaculture operations for 
species such as catfish and tilapia.  Another potential explanation for the lack of 
statistical significance for the coefficients on the catch of cod and pollock is that the 
prices used to estimate equation (2.7) are annual weighted averages over all vessels, 
ports, and delivery codes.  Therefore, it is possible that the aggregation is masking some 
price variation among different product forms for each species, as the price of fillets 
could increase at the same time as the price of surimi declines, which would mask any 
quantity impact on price.  The estimates from this inverse demand model are used in the 
numerical optimization procedure to predict future prices based on previous year’s prices 
and current harvest levels.   
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3.4 Numerical Optimization 
The functional forms used for estimation in chapter 3 prevent an analytical 
solution to the bioeconomic model developed in chapter 2.  Therefore, to examine how 
stocks, harvests, quotas, and profits evolve over time, numerical optimization methods 
are relied upon to provide a solution.  This also allows a comparison of the optimal 
multispecies solution to the single species solutions that ignore multispecies biological 
interactions.  This also permits quantification of the cost savings (additions) from cost 
complementarities (anti-complementarities) in the harvesting of multiple species.   
The base model with which alternative models are compared is the multispecies 
bioeconomic model discussed in chapter 2.  Vessels are assumed to maximize their 
profits each year by choosing the optimal number of trips to take with each gear type and 
their optimal harvest on each trip given the harvesting technology.  Thus, this is the social 
planner’s problem from section 2.2, which is expressed as:  
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where the y subscripts on the growth parameters ( , , )iy iy ijyr a  represent a random draw of 
the stock growth parameters.  Due to uncertainty in the underlying stock growth functions 
and future prices, rather than take these parameters as fixed for each year of the model, a 
random draw of parameter values ( , , )iy iy ijyr a  is taken from a multivariate normal 
distribution defined by the estimated parameters and variance/covariance matrix from 
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equations (2.1) and (2.7), respectively.13  These parameters are assumed to be known to 
the decision maker when determining the optimal quotas over time.   
 This problem takes the vessel profit maximization problem from section 2.1 and 
the optimized vessel profit function from equation (1.8) into account when determining 
the optimal quotas for each species in each year.  The multispecies model is compared 
with the estimated single species biological model from Table 2, using the same vessel 
profit functions.  The role of technological interactions is explored through the cost 
savings or additions from multispecies harvesting that come out of the estimated cost 
functions.  The optimal quota levels for each species are chosen for 25 years, after which 
time the harvest is equal to the steady state harvest levels with the corresponding ending 
stock levels, such that the stocks of all three species remain constant into the indefinite 
future.  The model is run 100 times for both the multispecies and single species model to 
determine the distribution of profits, stocks, and optimal quotas under different parameter 
values.  The discount rate is set at 0.05   for all model runs.  Results of these 
numerical optimizations are presented in section 3.5.   
3.5 Results 
The stocks and harvest of each species for the multispecies model and single 
species model are presented in Figure 7 and Figure 8, respectively.  The model runs begin 
with the year 2010 to the right of the green vertical line in the figures, with historical 
stock and harvest information to the left of the green line included for context.  The dark 
solid line in each graph is the median stock size for all simulations, while the dark dashed 
                                                 
13 For the single species model, a random draw is taken from a normal distribution defined by parameter 
and variance/covariance matrix estimated by equation (2.2), which is assumed to be independent of the 
other species.   
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line is the median harvest level.  The thin solid and dashed lines are the 25th and 75th 
percentile of the model runs for the stocks and harvests, respectively.   
The clear result from Figure 7 is that, in the multispecies model, it is optimal to 
drive down the stock of arrowtooth to increase the growth of cod and pollock.  As 
arrowtooth is not currently a target fishery in the BSAI, this implies that it is not 
profitable to harvest arrowtooth; therefore vessels have to take some losses on the 
harvesting of arrowtooth to allow for increased harvesting of cod and pollock in the long 
term.  For the single species model in Figure 8, arrowtooth is not profitable to target and 
is only caught as bycatch in the other fisheries which allows the stock to grow unimpeded 
throughout the model.  In the single species model, the stock of cod and pollock vary 
around their starting values throughout the model run.  In contrast, the multispecies 
model leads to an initial decline in the stock of cod, which increases after the stock of 
arrowtooth declines toward zero, and a relatively stable population of pollock.   
Summary statistics for the multispecies and single species models are presented in 
Table 8.  In the multispecies model, the steady state stock of arrowtooth is extremely low, 
which allows cod and pollock to have substantially higher steady state harvests in the 
multispecies model than in the single species model.  This increase in steady state harvest 
in the multispecies model causes the discounted sum of vessel profit functions, or the net 
present value, from the three species fishery to be over $5 billion dollars greater than the 
net present value of the single species model which ignores the biological interactions 
among species.  As the cod and pollock fisheries are particularly profitable, the net 
present value in the multispecies model is $20.7 billion dollars, while the net present 
value in the single species model is $15.1 billion dollars.   
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As the estimation of the vessel’s cost functions has shown that these vessels 
largely exhibit cost anti-complementarities, it is not terribly surprising that the 
technological interactions in the fishery lead to large increases in costs.  These costs are 
$345 million dollars for the multispecies model $135 million dollars for the single 
species model.  This implies that the cost anti-complementarities cause a .89% reduction 
in profits in the single species model, and a 1.7% reduction in profits for the multispecies 
model.   
In general, both models respond to the terminal condition by increasing harvests 
of cod and pollock in the years immediately prior to the terminal year to lower the steady 
state stock which increases the steady state growth and therefore steady state harvests and 
profits.  The overall results are qualitatively similar to a model with a 10 year time frame, 
the additional years used in this study allow for further adjustment toward the steady 
state.    While a longer time frame would lower the impact of the terminal condition on 
the solution, this study is limited by the current availability of computer power and time 
to do the analysis.   
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study shows that the impact of biological and technological interactions can 
substantially alter the optimal harvest policies compared with a single species 
bioeconomic model.  The net present value of the three species fishery is over $20.7 
billion dollars in the multispecies model, over $5 billion dollars more than the net present 
value of the single species model.  This is a function of the interdependence among 
species that affects other species growth.  Because arrowtooth negatively impacts the 
growth of cod and pollock, substantially increasing the harvest of arrowtooth to decrease 
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its stock is optimal in the multispecies model as it leads to increased growth and therefore 
greater potential harvests of cod and pollock.  The single species model does not 
incorporate these feedbacks among species, and therefore assumes each species is 
unaffected by the stock rise or collapse of the others.  The vessels in this fishery are also 
shown to exhibit cost anti-complementarities among species, which implies that 
harvesting multiple species jointly is more costly than catching them independently.  
These technological interactions result in a $345 million dollar increase in costs in the 
multispecies model, and $135 million dollar increase in costs for the single species 
model.   
There are a number of caveats to these results that should be mentioned.  A) There 
are regulations for the BSAI fisheries that may impact the results presented here.  First, 
the reauthorized Magnusson-Stevens act requires mandatory rebuilding strategies if a 
population, such as arrowtooth in this model, falls below a certain population threshold.  
Second, there is a 2 million ton per year limit on the total harvest of all managed 
groundfish species in the BSAI, which is nearly doubled by the optimal pollock harvest 
alone in some years in this model.  Including this cap on total harvest is left for future 
analysis, and would require examining the tradeoff between all managed groundfish 
species, not just those included here.  B)  The results from this model offer a potential 
explanation for the stock dynamics in this system, but these stock dynamics could change 
as environmental, climatic, or other factors external to the model change.  C)  Because 
arrowtooth and cod are top predators in the ecosystem, it is also possible that declines in 
the arrowtooth and cod populations could lead to increases in other populations that 
might increase overall NPV.  In other words, adjusting the boundaries of the system can 
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lead to alternative conclusions, so one should be conservative in situations where there 
are potential factors outside the boundaries influencing the results.  Similarly, how the 
model affects the ecosystem outside its boundaries can lead to alternative conclusions 
about what is optimal in reality.   
While there remain limitations to a direct application of this model to the fishery, 
it illustrates how multispecies management differs from single species management as a 
result of both biological and technological interactions among species.  The model can 
also be expanded to include a more detailed age-structured stock assessment model to 
further explore the role of age specific predator/prey interactions and age/length-specific 
harvest mortality, which likely varies by gear type.  This work is left for future analysis.   
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4. Optimal Multispecies Harvesting in the Presence of a Nuisance 
Species 
4.1 Introduction 
The recently completed Final Recommendations of the Interagency Ocean Policy 
Task Force has declared that adopting ecosystem based approaches towards management 
is their number one National Priority Objective.  They state that traditional management 
“has often lead to disjointed management approaches resulting in loss of resources, 
economic hardship, and environments at risk” [3].  However, research efforts are only 
beginning to understand the complex ecological linkages between species in an 
ecosystem and how these are affected by changing environmental conditions such as 
climate change, as well as the complex economic linkages between human activities such 
as multispecies harvesting, or implementing coastal marine spatial planning.  Moving 
toward ecosystem approaches requires updating our biological reference points for 
management from the current notion of single species maximum sustainable yield (MSY) 
to maximum sustainable ecosystem yield (MSEY) or an ecosystem based version of 
maximum economic yield (EMEY).  These ecosystem approaches need to focus on both 
the ecological interactions among species as well as the technological interactions which 
occur through combined harvesting of multiple species and the decision of how vessels 
allocate effort across multiple species.   
While not completely understood, the ecological interactions among species have 
been studied for many years.  However, in the current single species management system, 
these studies are of limited direct use to set harvest levels because they lack the detail of 
current stock assessments.  New multispecies stock assessment models are currently 
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being developed, and should improve understanding of the way multiple species grow, 
reproduce, and interact with one another [4].  
Similarly, while every fishery is different, there is a large literature in economics 
exploring the multiproduct nature of vessel’s production of multiple fish species using 
dual estimation methods [5-9].  However, these studies tend to ignore the impact that 
non-harvested species can have on both the ecological and economic outcomes in 
multispecies systems.  The role of non-harvested species in economic models has largely 
been relegated to bycatch and discards [11, 14, 15], or as constraints on the harvest of the 
target species via bycatch quotas [16].  However, populations of non-target species also 
impact the stock dynamics of target species and can lead to changes in optimal harvesting 
strategies.  A type of non-target species that may lead to dramatically different optimal 
harvesting policies is a nuisance species, which is one that lowers the value of the fishery 
by negatively affecting the growth of the other species in the ecosystem even though it 
has little harvest value of its own.   
 Arrowtooth flounder is proposed as a potential nuisance species in the Bering 
Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) region of Alaska.  It is a major predator of pollock, 
competes with cod for resources, and its harvest averages only a small fraction of its 
TAC.  This chapter extends the model used in previous chapters to solve for both an 
optimal subsidy on the harvest of the arrowtooth in addition to the optimal quotas for 
each of the species.     
4.2 Social Planner’s Optimization 
Recalling the social planner’s optimization from section 2.2, suppose the social 
planner again takes vessel profit maximizing behavior as given but chooses both the 
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optimal annual quotas in each year as well as the optimal subsidy (s) on arrowtooth 
harvest to maximize the net present value of the fishery.  The fishery manager chooses 
the optimal annual quota ( )yq  for all species and subsidy (sy) on arrowtooth harvest to 
maximize the profits from the three-species fishery over a 25 year time horizon with a 
terminal value function equal to the steady state harvest level at the ending stock levels in 
perpetuity, subject to the stock dynamics equations of each species.  This problem can be 
stated as:  
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where   is each vessel’s quota share for each species for each gear type, which is 
assumed equal to their historical harvesting with each gear type over the period 2008-
2010; sy is a subsidy on arrowtooth, which the fishery manager uses to encourage 
harvesting of the nuisance species; 1 (1 )    is the discount factor with discount rate 
;  Y = 25 years; the growth parameters ( , , )iy iy ijyr a  are generated as random draws for 
each year from a multivariate normal distribution defined by the estimated parameters 
and variance/covariance matrix from equations (2.1) and (2.7), respectively; and the 
overbars indicate that in the final period (Y+1) prices are equal to their average level. Let 
*
yvg  represent the solution of the vessel’s problem of maximizing annual profits by 
choice of harvest and number of trips or operating weeks with each gear type. Summed 
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where   is an intra-annual discount rate, and , 1vg tq   is a vector of the vessel’s available 
quota for each species harvested with gear g available on trip t+1, *vg q  is a vector of 
each vessel’s total quota allocation of each species to be harvested with each gear type, 
and T  is the number of trips taken by vessel v in year y with gear type g.  The subsidy 
on arrowtooth enters into each vessel’s profit function after the inverse demand model 
has determined the current year’s price based on the aggregate quantity harvested.   
vg
 As the functional forms used for estimation do not permit an analytical solution to 
the bioeconomic model described in equation (3.1), numerical optimization methods are 
relied upon to determine how optimal stocks, harvests, quotas, profits, and the subsidy on 
arrowtooth evolve over time.  Three different models are compared in section 4.3, the 
multispecies model of chapter 3, a model ignoring arrowtooth’s impact on the system by 
keeping arrowtooth’s harvest at its current percentage of the stock with no subsidy, and 
an optimized subsidy model that determines the optimal quota of all three species as well 
as an optimal subsidy on arrowtooth.   
4.3 Numerical Optimization  
 The numerical optimization method solves the maximization problem in equation 
(3.1) for the optimal quotas for each species and subsidy on arrowtooth for 25 years, at 
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which point the model enters the steady state at the ending stock levels, assuming the 
harvest is equal to the growth of each species in perpetuity, and prices and growth 
parameters are equal to their mean from all previous years in the simulation.  The social 
planner is assumed to have perfect foresight, i.e., to know the full draw of random 
parameters for each year of the simulation when determining the optimal quotas in any 
year.  The model is simulated 100 times for each case: the base multispecies model with 
no subsidy on arrowtooth, the model with a constant harvest of arrowtooth equal to its 
average historical rate of harvest (1.5% of the stock), and the full model with a potential 
subsidy on the harvesting of arrowtooth.  These model simulations determine the 
distribution of profits, stocks, optimal quotas, and subsidy on arrowtooth harvests using 
the randomly drawn parameter values.  The discount rate is assumed to be 0.05 for all 
models.   
 The stocks and harvest levels are presented in Figure 7 for the base multispecies 
model, Figure 9 for the constant harvest rate on arrowtooth model, and Figure 10 for the 
full model with an arrowtooth subsidy.  The model runs begin after 2010, which is to the 
right of the green vertical line. The historical stocks and harvest levels are included to 
provide context for the model runs.  Median values from all model runs are presented 
with the solid lines, while the 25th and 75th percentile values are represented by the thin 
lines.  Table 9 presents summary statistics including the stocks, harvests, and net present 
value estimates from each model.   
 As was shown in chapter 3 for the base multispecies model, Figure 7 shows that 
optimal policy greatly increases the harvesting of arrowtooth so that the stock of cod and 
pollock are allowed to thrive, resulting in a median net present value from the base 
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multispecies model of $20.7 billion dollars.  This harvesting strategy results in losses to 
the vessels harvesting arrowtooth in the initial periods as harvesting arrowtooth is not 
currently profitable.  This is based on the fact that there is no directed target fishery for 
arrowtooth and vessels with extra capacity and time could easily target arrowtooth if it 
were profitable.  These losses are made up from increased harvesting of cod and pollock 
throughout the 25-year period as Table 1 shows that the stock of arrowtooth decreases the 
growth of both cod and pollock.     
 The model with a constant harvest rate of arrowtooth shown in Figure 9 highlights 
how ignoring the role of arrowtooth impacts this ecosystem.  Keeping the harvest rate of 
arrowtooth constant at the low current rate results in drastically reduced stocks of both 
cod and pollock, and a median net present value of only $8.5 billion dollars.  Comparing 
this result to the base multispecies model, ignoring the role of the nuisance species results 
in a loss of over $12 billion dollars from this three species fishery.  In the early years of 
the model run, it is optimal to harvest a large quantity of cod, because if vessels do not 
harvest the cod, arrowtooth consume the cod, which provides no value to the fishery.  
Throughout the rest of the model, both the stock and harvest of cod are very low.   The 
reduced stocks of cod and pollock translate into smaller harvests of cod and pollock in 
the steady state, but larger harvests of the less valuable arrowtooth.   
 Not surprisingly, the stock dynamics for the model with an arrowtooth subsidy 
presented in Figure 10 show a similar pattern to the base multispecies model.  However, 
arrowtooth is harvested more aggressively and approaches a zero stock level by the year 
2030 in the subsidy model while the base multispecies model approaches a zero stock 
level around the year 2035.  The more aggressive harvesting of arrowtooth translates to 
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larger steady state harvests of cod and pollock and an increase in the net present value of 
the fishery of $273 million dollars for an estimated net present value of $20.9 billion 
dollars.  The steady state stock of cod is slightly higher and the steady state stock of 
pollock is slightly lower in the arrowtooth subsidy model which translates into higher 
steady state harvests of cod and pollock compared with the base multispecies model.   
 Table 9 shows that the median discounted subsidy for harvesting arrowtooth 
summed over the 25 years plus the steady state is $35 million dollars.  The median 
subsidy per pound of arrowtooth harvested is $0.113, which is equivalent to an increase 
of over 3 times the median price of arrowtooth of $0.032.  Therefore, a fairly large 
increase in the price of arrowtooth is necessary to shift enough effort into the fishery to 
maximize the net present value of the combined three-species fishery.  This large price 
response could be a result of the lack of a well defined market for arrowtooth in the 
period used for the inverse demand model.  It is possible that the demand response may 
be more subdued if markets for arrowtooth grow.  The price of fish meal has increased 
substantially in recent years, and arrowtooth is an excellent candidate for additional fish 
meal production, which may counteract any reduction in the arrowtooth price from the 
increased quantity on the market.   
The subsidy on arrowtooth results in a $273 million dollar increase in the value of 
the fishery after subtracting the cost of the subsidy.  This subsidy could be paid from a 
lump sum tax on cod and pollock harvests based on the quotas shares of each species, as 
they are the main beneficiaries of increased arrowtooth harvests.  It may also be possible 
to introduce a per pound tax on the harvest of cod and pollock equal to the marginal cost 
of a unit of arrowtooth on the marginal profit from harvesting a unit of cod and pollock.  
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This will likely alter the targeting behavior of vessels at the margin, and therefore is left 
for future analysis.   
 Table 9 also shows that there are substantial cost anti-complementarities in this 
multispecies fishery, which is not surprising given that there are diseconomies of scope 
found in the estimation of the cost functions.  At a value of $345, $76, and $841 million 
dollars for the base multispecies model, constant harvest rate model, and the subsidy on 
arrowtooth model, respectively, these are fairly substantial costs incurred by the fishery. 
But they only result in losses equivalent to 1.7%, 0.89%, and 4.0% of the net present 
value of each model, respectively.   
Similar to the models presented in chapter 3, all models increase the harvest of 
cod and pollock near the end of the time horizon in response to the terminal condition to 
lower the steady state stock and therefore steady state profits.  These results are also 
similar to a 10 year time horizon model, and a time horizon longer than 25 years would 
likely be preferable with sufficient increases in computing power.   
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
Using a multispecies bioeconomic model, this study shows how the impact of a 
nuisance species (arrowtooth flounder) can substantially alter the optimal harvest policies 
for profitable species (Pacific cod and walleye pollock) in a multispecies ecosystem.  As 
arrowtooth negatively impacts the growth of cod and pollock, it makes economic sense to 
subsidize the harvesting of arrowtooth to lower its population and thus increase the stock 
of cod and pollock, and consequent profits from those fisheries.  The median optimal 
total discounted subsidy amounts to $35 million dollars, but increases the net present 
value of the fishery by $273 million dollars net of the cost of the subsidy.  Ignoring 
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arrowtooth interactions on cod and pollock results in respective steady state stocks of cod 
and pollock that are only 5% and 39% as large as the base multispecies model from 
chapter 3, and steady state harvests that are only 11% and 55% of their base multispecies 
model values.   
A number of caveats must be considered in using the results of this research 
before encouraging additional harvests of arrowtooth.  First, this model uses a reduced 
form ecological model that has substantial limitations regarding age-structured ecological 
interactions, as well as gear-specific age selectivities.  The model accounts for this 
uncertainty by allowing the parameters of the growth functions to vary stochastically 
each year in the model and across model simulations.  However, the stock dynamics in 
the ecosystem could change as factors external to the model change.  Examples include 
changes in biogeochemical cycles, changes in abundance of other important prey species, 
changes in primary productivity of the ecosystem, and climate change.  
Second, the study lacks data on real profits, but rather approximates profits with 
net revenues with some assumptions about the costs of fishing.  Substantial fixed costs 
for vessel operation are likely, and fuel costs likely impact fishery profits. These costs are 
excluded from this model because data are not available.   
Third, no attempt has been made to model specific regulations specific to these 
fisheries in the BSAI, such as the 2 million ton per year limit on the total harvest of all 
managed groundfish species in the BSAI. This limit is exceeded by the pollock harvest 
alone in some years of the model simulation.  Exploring the role of the cap on total 
harvest is left for future analysis, and is likely to become a major issue among various 
fishing interests if the pollock stock rebounds as expected.  Harvesting arrowtooth to the 
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extent proposed by the model would also likely classify arrowtooth as overfished and 
necessitate a rebuilding strategy for arrowtooth, but that possibility is left for future 
analysis.   
Finally, because cod are a top predator in this ecosystem, increases in the cod 
population may lead to decreases in other fish populations, which may result in an overall 
decrease in NPV outside of these three species alone.  An important consideration for 
multispecies and ecosystem based approaches is that adjusting the boundaries of the 
system can lead to alternative conclusions, which argues for conservative actions in 
situations where outside factors potentially influence the results.  Similarly, changes in 
the stock dynamics within the model affect the ecosystem outside the model’s 
boundaries, which can lead to alternative conclusions about optimal management in 
reality.   
While there are substantial limitations as to the direct application of this model to 
the fishery, it illustrates how non-target species impact target species not only through 
bycatch but also through ecosystem and technological interactions, leading to drastically 
different optimal harvest policies.  The model can also be expanded to include a more 
detailed age-structured stock assessment model, gear-specific age selectivities, and 





















































Stocks and harvest from the optimal multispecies model.a    
 
a The model begins in 2010 (to the right of the green line), and the thin lines represent 25th and 75th 
percentiles from the model.  Historical stocks and harvests are included for context. 
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Figure 8  
Stocks and harvest from the optimal single species model.a   
 
a The model begins in 2010 (to the right of the green line), the thick lines are the median model run while 
the thin lines represent 25th and 75th percentile runs of the model.  Historical stocks and harvests are 
included for context. 
75 
Figure 9 
Stocks and harvest from the optimal multispecies model with a constant harvest rate on 
arrowtooth equal to the historical average (1.5% of the stock).a   
 
 
a The model begins in 2010 (to the right of the green line), the thick lines are the median model run while 
the thin lines represent 25th and 75th percentile runs of the model.  Historical stocks and harvests are 








a The model begins in 2010 (to the right of the green line), the thick lines are the median model run while 
the thin lines represent 25th and 75th percentile runs of the model.  Historical stocks and harvests are 















Multispecies Stock Dynamics Parameter Estimatesa 
 
Growth Model Parameter Coefficient Standard Error 
rarth 1.0067*** 0.0238 
ηarth -0.0041 0.0149 




αarth,plck -0.0019* 0.0011 
rcod 1.6539*** 0.0815 
ηcod -0.1563*** 0.0369 




αcod,plck -0.0103* 0.0055 
rplck 2.0177*** 0.2647 
ηplck -0.0582*** 0.0150 




αplck,cod -0.0324 0.0979 
a An “*” denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, “**” denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
level, and “***” denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.  Prior to estimation, all variables were 
rescaled to one millionth of their actual values, thus the resulting coefficient estimates represent a change of
one million units.  Parameters are defined as follows: r represents the intrinsic growth rate,   represents 
the density dependent factor related to the carrying capacity, and ,i j represents the biological interaction 
between species i and species j, where arth represents arrowtooth flounder, cod represents Pacific cod, and 




Single Species Stock Dynamics Parameter Estimatesa 
 
Growth Model Parameter Coefficient Standard Error 
rssarth 1.102*** 0.00989 Arrowtooth Flounder 
N=34 ηssarth -.0557*** .0125 
rsscod 1.292*** 0.0499 Pacific Cod 
N=33 ηsscod -.1005*** .0234 
rssplck 1.599*** 0.148 Walleye Pollock 
N=33 ηssplck -.045*** .0133 
a An “*” denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, “**” denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
level, and “***” denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.  Prior to estimation, all variables were 
rescaled to one millionth of their actual values, thus the resulting coefficient estimates represent a change of
one million units.  Parameters are defined as follows: rss represents the intrinsic growth rate and ηss 
represents the density dependent factor related to carrying capacity, where arth represents arrowtooth 




Cost function estimates for Catcher Vessels (CVs)a  
Coefficient CV Longline CV Non-Pelagic Trawl CV Pot CV Pelagic Trawl 
     
w 1*** 1*** 1*** 1*** 
     
harth  41.6*  39.3*** 
  (1.96)  (4.21) 
hcod -65.1 11.4*** -21.8*** 7.17 
 (-1.56) (21.83) (-4.39) (0.88) 
hplck  9.07***  3.96*** 
  (3.48)  (34.24) 
xarth  -2052***  -1124*** 
  (-12.25)  (-14.15) 
xcod -2627 -1930*** 19678*** -930*** 
 (-0.24) (-4.99) (4.21) (-11.00) 
xplck  48.1***  19.1*** 
  (5.39)  (7.16) 
Zgrt -11.1 -17.5*** 119*** 10.4*** 
 (-0.15) (-4.84) (3.78) (6.91) 
Zlgth 106 178*** -562*** 37.5*** 
 (0.35) (8.30) (-4.77) (6.65) 
Zhp -41 -221*** 261 -141*** 
 (-0.07) (-6.39) (0.70) (-3.30) 
w,w -.00121 -.0144* -.0288*** -.053*** 
 (-0.22) (-2.19) (-5.87) (-16.65) 
w,harth  .11  .227*** 
  (1.48)  (3.99) 
w,hcod .858*** .117*** .545*** -.0481 
 (8.06) (24.70) (30.78) (-0.85) 
w,hplck  .0995***  .0447*** 
  (5.59)  (48.31) 
w,xcod -.194  -.0757  
 (-1.40)  (-0.60)  
w,Zgrt .213*** .00142 .0467*** .0254*** 
 (12.04) (0.27) (3.98) (6.13) 
w,Zlgth -.0456 .197*** .153*** .148*** 
 (-1.41) (11.64) (5.60) (15.89) 
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w,Zhp -.193 -.51*** -.304* -.344*** 
 (-1.41) (-6.30) (-2.21) (-9.13) 
harth,harth  .102  .0774 
  (0.37)  (0.35) 
harth,hcod  .109  -1.86** 
  (1.13)  (-2.72) 
harth,hplck  .511  .0278** 
  (1.26)  (2.59) 
harth,Zgrt  .168  .106 
  (1.01)  (1.52) 
harth,Zlgth  -.923*  -.392 
  (-2.15)  (-1.95) 
harth,Zhp  -.569  -1.18* 
  (-0.33)  (-2.02) 
hcod,hcod .0366 .000666 -.00326 -.505 
 (0.45) (0.70) (-1.14) (-1.86) 
hcod,hplck  .0606***  .0325*** 
  (6.04)  (3.98) 
hcod,xcod 54  17.4*  
 (0.94)  (2.46)  
hcod,Zgrt .0424 .00304 -.0179* .159* 
 (0.34) (1.86) (-2.00) (2.52) 
hcod,Zlgth -.237 -.0455*** .045* -.479*** 
 (-0.48) (-5.33) (2.08) (-3.87) 
hcod,Zhp 1.24 .00653 .161 -.248 
 (0.69) (0.18) (1.70) (-0.62) 
hplck,hplck  -.00627  .000115 
  (-0.78)  (1.74) 
hplck,Zgrt  .0232  .000117 
  (1.73)  (0.14) 
hplck,Zlgth  -.0788  -.00244 
  (-1.57)  (-1.20) 
hplck,Zhp  -.0672  -.0153* 
  (-0.49)  (-2.01) 
xcod,xcod 2053  -17424***  
 (0.26)  (-4.54)  
xcod,Zgrt -10.6  12.9  
 (-0.40)  (1.69)  
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xcod,Zlgth .331  3  
 (0.00)  (0.23)  
xcod,Zhp 208  69.3  
 (0.64)  (1.13)  
Zgrt,Zgrt -.116 .0112 .525** -.00102 
 (-0.55) (1.66) (2.76) (-0.37) 
Zgrt,Zlgth 1.18 .568*** -6.76*** -.123*** 
 (0.44) (4.75) (-4.21) (-3.70) 
Zgrt,Zhp 7.53 -2.46*** 25.6* -.133 
 (0.82) (-4.95) (2.29) (-0.42) 
Zlgth,Zlgth -2.44 -3.77*** 16.3*** -.195 
 (-0.35) (-6.87) (3.76) (-1.36) 
Zlgth,Zhp -16.4 23*** -80.8 .966 
 (-0.48) (6.46) (-1.68) (0.74) 
Zhp,Zhp 17.1 -51.4*** 142 5.6*** 
 (1.61) (-6.73) (1.03) (3.34) 
V 179 750 781 3462 
R2 .883 .869 .875 .889 
a An “*” denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, “**” denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
level, and “***” denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.  The t statistics are in parentheses.  
Coefficient names represent the subscripts of the α coefficients in equation (2.3). Names separated by 
“,”denote cross product terms in the cost function.  Parameters are defined as follows: w represents the 
daily crew services wage, h represents harvest, x represents the stock, and Z represents fixed vessels 
characteristics, where arth represents arrowtooth flounder, cod represents Pacific cod, plck represents 
walleye pollock, grt represents gross tonnage, lgth represents length, hp represents horsepower, and V is the 
number of observations used to estimate each equation.  As the R2 statistic is not a well defined concept for 






Cost function estimates for Catcher Processor Vessels (CPs)a 
Coefficient CP Longline CP Non-Pelagic Trawl CP Pot CP Pelagic Trawl 
     
w 1*** 1*** 1*** 1*** 
     
harth 82.7 -44.4**  -936** 
 (1.59) (-3.20)  (-2.69) 
hcod 9.96*** -14.9* -1.03 65.6 
 (10.30) (-2.44) (-0.20) (1.59) 
hplck 18.5 -6.46  2.04*** 
 (1.76) (-0.08)  (3.50) 
xarth -3424*** -3004  -9654*** 
 (-27.24) (-1.03)  (-7.51) 
xcod 3518*** -75903*** 907 28742*** 
 (6.48) (-5.51) (0.30) (20.41) 
xplck -286*** 21.8  -2899*** 
 (-37.30) (0.12)  (-11.95) 
Zgrt 734** -1430  637*** 
 (2.58) (-0.12)  (4.74) 
Zlgth 4.95 206 54.1 -122** 
 (0.18) (0.07) (1.11) (-3.16) 
Zhp 32.1 4751 -890** 347*** 
 (0.14) (0.23) (-3.13) (4.53) 
w,w -.188*** -1.38*** -.391*** -2.06*** 
 (-18.10) (-7.44) (-9.02) (-22.69) 
w,harth -.499*** .0412  -14.8*** 
 (-8.53) (1.08)  (-16.56) 
w,hcod .103*** .129*** .764*** 1.57*** 
 (19.41) (3.89) (12.24) (5.51) 
w,hplck .499*** -.0133  .0295*** 
 (8.53) (-0.03)  (7.85) 
w,xcod -2.15*** 6.68* -5.21***  
 (-15.91) (1.96) (-8.13)  
w,xplck    9.7*** 
    (11.85) 
w,Zgrt -.592*** -8.89* 6.85*** .53 
 (-3.84) (-2.55) (11.95) (1.72) 
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w,Zlgth .966*** 2.78*** 1.2*** 2.96*** 
 (71.32) (9.42) (15.65) (47.83) 
w,Zhp 1.86*** .664 -2.59*** 2.1*** 
 (26.01) (0.57) (-4.47) (9.47) 
harth,harth -7.13* .0112  -2.96 
 (-2.12) (1.81)  (-0.69) 
harth,hcod .783** .149  1.91 
 (3.14) (0.88)  (0.58) 
harth,hplck 6.19*** .329  .04 
 (3.37) (0.77)  (0.58) 
harth,xcod -215*** 65.8*   
 (-3.89) (2.50)   
harth,xplck    -24.7 
    (-1.14) 
harth,Zgrt -4.15 .304  6.66 
 (-0.93) (0.10)  (0.59) 
harth,Zlgth -.103 .0277  .181 
 (-0.14) (0.24)  (0.13) 
harth,Zhp .0755 -.0537  -4.1 
 (0.04) (-0.04)  (-1.03) 
hcod,hcod -.00331* -.00658 .0224** .463 
 (-2.27) (-1.62) (2.95) (1.27) 
hcod,hplck .0727** .244  .00164 
 (3.10) (1.65)  (0.11) 
hcod,xcod -3.8*** 35.5*** -45.8***  
 (-5.06) (6.32) (-8.69)  
hcod,xplck    19.7*** 
    (4.71) 
hcod,Zgrt -.283*** .701 .272 7.22*** 
 (-3.65) (0.63) (0.76) (6.30) 
hcod,Zlgth .0171 -.0603 -.126 -1.15*** 
 (1.85) (-0.71) (-1.73) (-4.99) 
hcod,Zhp .08* .207 .47 -.706 
 (2.36) (1.01) (1.08) (-0.83) 
hplck,hplck .0114 -.507  -.000116 
 (0.13) (-0.73)  (-0.85) 
hplck,xcod 12.9 -41   
 (1.68) (-0.47)   
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hplck,xplck    -.083 
    (-1.50) 
hplck,Zgrt 4.97*** -10.8  -.054*** 
 (4.90) (-1.00)  (-3.52) 
hplck,Zlgth .0173 .982  .0147*** 
 (0.17) (0.87)  (4.55) 
hplck,Zhp -1.54*** -2.36  -.0171 
 (-3.97) (-0.75)  (-1.64) 
xcod,xcod 3393*** 49561*** 2782  
 (8.44) (5.05) (1.66)  
xcod,Zgrt 613*** -1724* 950***  
 (23.38) (-1.98) (4.75)  
xcod,Zlgth -63.1*** 255*** -147***  
 (-20.30) (3.52) (-3.89)  
xcod,Zhp -10.2 -400 653**  
 (-0.81) (-1.85) (2.66)  
xplck,xplck    179*** 
    (9.36) 
xplck,Zgrt    5.44 
    (1.27) 
xplck,Zlgth    3.21** 
    (3.17) 
xplck,Zhp    -.6 
    (-0.20) 
Zgrt,Zgrt 10.8 -386 60.2* -3.05 
 (0.47) (-0.09) (2.38) (-0.98) 
Zgrt,Zlgth -15.1*** 37.5 -8.09* -6.06* 
 (-4.37) (0.06) (-2.51) (-2.22) 
Zgrt,Zhp 6.39 241 5.65 7.44 
 (0.22) (0.13) (0.33) (0.82) 
Zlgth,Zlgth .733 4.8 1.29** 1.51*** 
 (1.51) (0.07) (2.73) (4.93) 
Zlgth,Zhp 8.02 -109 1.87 .0633 
 (1.92) (-0.20) (0.60) (0.11) 
Zhp,Zhp -37.4*** 162 -2.24 -4.65 
 (-4.37) (0.19) (-0.10) (-1.69) 
V 7312 345 398 3448 
R2 .953 .901 .947 .961 
a An “*” denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, “**” denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
level, and “***” denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.  The t statistics are in parentheses.  
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Coefficient names represent the subscripts of the α coefficients in equation (2.3). Names separated by 
“,”denote cross product terms in the cost function  Parameters are defined as follows: w represents the daily 
crew services wage, h represents harvest, x represents the stock, and Z represents fixed vessels 
characteristics, where arth represents arrowtooth flounder, cod represents Pacific cod, plck represents 
walleye pollock, grt represents gross tonnage, lgth represents length, hp represents horsepower, and V is the 
number of observations used to estimate each equation.  As the R2 statistic is not a well defined concept for 







Poisson Regression for Annual Number of Trips for Catcher Vessels (CVs)a 
Coefficient CV Longline CV Non-Pelagic Trawl CV Pot CV Pelagic Trawl 
     
Zgrt -.0275*** .00157*** .000796 .00271*** 
 (-8.29) (4.63) (1.30) (12.20) 
Zlgth .0539*** .00674*** -.00321 -.00506*** 
 (7.02) (4.67) (-1.73) (-5.28) 
Zhp -.00141 -.00994 -.00928 -.046*** 
 (-0.06) (-1.74) (-0.98) (-14.16) 
qarth -11.2*** 1.8* -6.53*** 2.56*** 
 (-5.05) (2.49) (-7.46) (6.16) 
qcod 23.8*** 7.73*** 15.2*** -7.19*** 
 (5.78) (4.32) (7.52) (-6.80) 
qplck -2.59*** -.623** -.671** .935*** 
 (-5.75) (-3.03) (-2.88) (8.37) 
parth -.0448*** -.00894** -.185*** .00386*** 
 (-5.17) (-2.80) (-14.95) (5.66) 
pcod .00383*** .00146*** .00391*** -.00189*** 
 (12.84) (14.96) (24.61) (-30.05) 
pplck -.0293*** .000372 -.0124*** .00591*** 
 (-18.50) (1.27) (-15.95) (28.78) 
w .00483** .0283*** .0118*** .00392** 
 (3.15) (11.92) (5.06) (3.08) 
hlgl,arth .531***    
 (6.18)    
hlgl,cod .0109***    
 (21.68)    
hlgl,plck .721***    
 (7.64)    
hnpt,arth  .00697***   
  (5.90)   
hnpt,cod  .00134***   
  (42.91)   
hnpt,plck  .00417***   
  (13.17)   
hpot,arth   -.0664  
   (-1.03)  
hpot,cod   .00416***  
   (41.49)  
hpot,plck   .00729***  
   (4.49)  
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hptr,arth    .0147*** 
    (11.70) 
hptr,cod    .000301 
    (0.72) 
hptr,plck    .000149*** 
    (38.22) 
constant -1.29 -6.64*** -2.4*** .811** 
 (-1.51) (-13.17) (-4.31) (2.81) 
V 726 1155 1897 1026 
Pseudo R2 0.586 0.446 0.593 0.609 
a An “*” denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, “**” denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
level, and “***” denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.  The t statistics are in parentheses.  
Coefficient names represent elements of the β vector in equation (2.6). Names separated by “,”denote cross 
product terms.  Parameters are defined as follows: Z represents fixed vessels characteristics, q represents 
the annual total allowable catch, p represents output prices, w represents the daily crew services wage, and 
h represents harvest, where arth represents arrowtooth flounder, cod represents Pacific cod, plck represents 
walleye pollock, grt represents gross tonnage, lgth represents length, hp represents horsepower, lgl 
represents longline gear, npt represents non-pelagic trawl gear, pot represents pot gear, ptr represents 





Poisson Regression for Annual Number of Weeks for Catcher Processors (CPs)a 
Coefficient CP Longline CP Non-Pelagic Trawl CP Pot CP Pelagic Trawl 
     
Zgrt -.0341*** -.0314*** .072** -.0207*** 
 (-6.29) (-8.44) (3.04) (-8.15) 
Zlgth .000976 .00433*** .0188*** .00541*** 
 (1.62) (9.09) (6.55) (10.51) 
Zhp -.0212*** -.0186*** -.204*** -.00725*** 
 (-10.44) (-11.87) (-13.98) (-4.36) 
qarth -2.11*** -29.1*** -9.66*** 6.13*** 
 (-3.30) (-22.64) (-3.43) (5.11) 
qcod 11.8*** -25.3*** 1.03 -8.14*** 
 (8.36) (-15.12) (0.17) (-3.61) 
qplck -.926*** -6.34*** -5.16*** -.239 
 (-5.34) (-20.73) (-6.42) (-0.81) 
parth -.00248*** .0113*** -.00124 -.00187*** 
 (-15.34) (32.61) (-1.56) (-4.95) 
pcod .00139*** -.00261*** .00263*** .000121 
 (15.12) (-21.07) (7.24) (0.75) 
pplck -.00194*** -.0075*** -.0101*** -.00115 
 (-4.38) (-12.36) (-5.18) (-1.49) 
w .00851*** .0494*** .0518*** .0068** 
 (6.05) (22.17) (7.58) (2.73) 
hlgl,arth .00249***    
 (11.54)    
hlgl,cod .000513***    
 (64.67)    
hlgl,plck .000217    
 (1.83)    
hnpt,arth  .000174***   
  (11.34)   
hnpt,cod  .000298***   
  (20.33)   
hnpt,plck  .000915***   
  (32.90)   
hpot,arth   .326*  
   (2.14)  
hpot,cod   .00159***  
   (24.06)  
hpot,plck   .122***  
   (3.66)  
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hptr,arth    -.00711*** 
    (-9.33) 
hptr,cod    .00131*** 
    (5.84) 
hptr,plck    .000086*** 
    (41.66) 
constant -.486* 10.1*** .0768 .315 
 (-2.45) (30.11) (0.09) (0.75) 
V 842 661 496 823 
Pseudo R2 0.590 0.645 0.511 0.733 
a An “*” denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, “**” denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
level, and “***” denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.  The t statistics are in parentheses.  
Coefficient names represent elements of the β vector in equation (2.6). Names separated by “,”denote cross 
product terms.  Parameters are defined as follows: Z represents fixed vessels characteristics, q represents 
the annual total allowable catch, p represents output prices, w represents the daily crew services wage, and 
h represents harvest, where arth represents arrowtooth flounder, cod represents Pacific cod, plck represents 
walleye pollock, grt represents gross tonnage, lgth represents length, hp represents horsepower, lgl 
represents longline gear, npt represents non-pelagic trawl gear, pot represents pot gear, ptr represents 





Inverse Demand Model Maximum Likelihood Estimatesa 
 
Coefficient Arrowtooth Flounder Cod Pollock 
parth 0.7024*** 0.3357 0.0908 
 (.13) (.228) (.067) 
pcod -0.0744 0.3488 0.1048 
 (.147) (.274) (.079) 
pplck -0.3533 0.5015 0.3772* 
 (.388) (.703) (.208) 
harth -0.0192***   
 (.007)   
hcod  -0.0020  
  (.002)  
hplck   -0.00002 
   (.0001) 
constant 426.27*** 600.59** 97.3175 
 (97.279) (295.123) (85.15) 
N 24   
Log Likelihood -443.21   
a An “*” denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, “**” denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
level, and “***” denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Parameters are defined as follows: p represents output prices and h represents harvest, where arth 
represents arrowtooth flounder, cod represents Pacific cod, plck represents walleye pollock, and N is the 










Median arrowtooth stock 893,573 1,410,421 
Median cod stock 812,172 1,128,886 
Median pollock stock 3,342,853 6,003,977 
Median arrowtooth harvest 23,162 263 
Median cod harvest 168,780 137,717 
Median pollock harvest 1,014,909 1,278,845 
Steady State arrowtooth stock 5,464 1,605,987 
Steady State cod stock 2,146,524 1,148,500 
Steady State pollock stock 9,182,786 5,396,862 
Steady State arrowtooth harvest 195 0 
Steady State cod harvest 411,691 137,717 
Steady State pollock harvest 3,402,099 1,766,370 
Median Cost savings from cost 
complementaritiesa $345,167,972 $135,657,175 
Median Net Present Value $20,709,805,578 $15,130,291,490 





Comparison of the base multispecies model, constant arrowtooth harvest rate model, and 










Median arrowtooth stock 893,573 1,081,263 1,125,174
Median cod stock 812,172 126,826 506,646
Median pollock stock 3,342,853 3,356,398 4,432,864
Median arrowtooth harvest 23,162 15,000 24,672
Median cod harvest 168,780 56,490 95,987
Median pollock harvest 1,014,909 969,216 1,347,446
Steady State arrowtooth stock 5,464 891,565 11,319
Steady State cod stock 2,146,524 112,235 2,196,158
Steady State pollock stock 9,182,786 3,622,073 6,298,071
Steady State arrowtooth harvest 195 12,468 738
Steady State cod harvest 411,691 44,833 523,727
Steady State pollock harvest 3,402,099 1,901,260 3,747,942
Median Cost savings from cost 
complementaritiesa $345,167,972 $75,968,781 $841,196,874
Median total subsidy on 
arrowtooth   $34,821,608
Median arrowtooth subsidy in 
$/lb   $0.113
Median Net Present Value $20,709,805,578 $8,477,792,854 $20,983,364,133
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